

UNIVERSITY OF UPPSALA

Unit of Development Studies

C-level essay

Spring 2005

Trade Unions in Democratisation

-a case study of the politicisation of the *Zambian Congress of Trade Unions*

Supervisor: Lars Rudebeck

Author: Jannica Hedblom

Abstract

Title: Trade Unions in Democratisation

-a case study of the politicisation of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions

This essay aims to describe how it is possible that major interest organisations tend to lose their political influence after the transition from authoritarian rule. As one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia experienced a peaceful transition to a multi-party constitution in 1991. The major mobilising force behind the transition was the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Contrary to expectations, ZCTU's political influence decreased throughout the 1990's and the trend has continued. The analysis compares ZCTU over time by applying elements of Olle Törnquist's theoretical approach on politicisation. The core of Törnquist's approach is that if organisations connect their interests to wider social projects, by linking up with a political party and organisations in civil society, their influence in democratisation is more likely. The results show that Törnquist's theoretical approach is fruitful in explaining ZCTU's development throughout the 1990's and that despite ZCTU's efforts to re-position itself, its political influence remains shallow.

Sammanfattning

Denna studie syftar till att beskriva hur de kommer sig att tidigare inflytelserika organisationer i det civila samhället tenderar att förlora sitt politiska inflytande efter övergången från en auktoritär regim. Zambia var ett av de första länderna söder om Sahara som på fredlig väg införde flerpartisystem 1991. Den kraft i det civila samhället som stod bakom mobiliseringen var Zambias ungefärliga motsvarighet till LO i Sverige; *the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions* (ZCTU). I motsats till förväntningarna minskade ZCTUs politiska inflytande under 1990-talet och trenden fortsätter. I analysen jämförs ZCTU över tid genom att applicera delar av Olle Törnquists teoretiska angreppssätt vad gäller politisering. Kärnan i Törnquists sätt att angripa problemet är att om organisationer lyckas länka samman sina intressen till ett omfattande socialt projekt, knyta an till ett politiskt parti och organisationer i det civila samhället, tenderar deras inflytande i demokratiserings processen att öka. Analysen visar att Törnquists teoretiska angreppssätt i stor utsträckning lyckas förklara hur situationen i Zambia utvecklades under 1990-talet och att trots ZCTUs försök till omstrukturering, förblir organisationens politiska inflytande svagt.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

1	INTRODUCTION	5
1.1	Background of the Case	6
1.2	Purpose and Research Questions Examined	6
1.3	Limitations	7
1.4	Outline of the Essay	8
2	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	9
2.1	What is Democracy?	9
2.2	Democratisation - not a Linear Process	11
2.3	Theories on Civil Society and Democratisation	12
2.4	The Role of Trade Unions in Democratisation	15
2.5	Post-Marxism, an Analytical Framework	15
2.6	Politics of Democratisation - three Aspects	17
	<i>2.6.1 Political Space</i>	18
	<i>2.6.2 Political Inclusion</i>	18
	<i>2.6.3 Politicisation of Interests and Issues</i>	20
	<i>2.6.4 Törnquist's Ideal Type of Politicisation</i>	22
3	METHOD	22
3.1	Validity, Reliability and Generalisations	23
3.2	Discussions on Written Material	24
3.3	Relevance of Theory	25
4	THE CASE OF ZAMBIA	25
4.1	Short Trade Union History and Major Political Events 1964-1990	25
4.2	The Change to a Multi-Party Constitution in 1991	28
	<i>4.2.1 Political Space - Empowerment in Civil Society and the Formation of MMD</i>	28
	<i>4.2.2 Political Inclusion by Unitary Strategies</i>	31
	<i>4.2.3 Politicisation by Common Interests</i>	35
4.3	Decline of Labour's Political Influence During the 1990's	37
	<i>4.3.1 MMD - an Authoritarian Party?</i>	37
	<i>4.3.2 Decreased Political Space due to Political Pluralism</i>	40
	<i>4.3.3 Political Inclusion, the Lack of 'Mobilisation Structures'</i>	43

4.3.4 <i>Politicisation of Interest and Issues in a Context of Privatisation</i>	45
5 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS	49
5.1 The Pluralist Paradox	50
5.2 Unitary Inclusion but ‘Blurred’ Ideology	52
5.3 ZCTU’s Politicisation in 1991 and 2001	53
5.4 ZCTU’s Role in Democratisation and Future Prospects	55
REFERENCES	57
Bibliography	57
Abbreviations	59

1 INTRODUCTION

As one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia experienced a peaceful transition to a multi-party constitution in 1991 after nearly two decades of authoritarian rule. The new government was formed by Movement for Multiparty Democracy (henceforth MMD), a political party founded by one of the major forces in the change to a multi-party constitution; the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (henceforth ZCTU). Judging from its organisational network, level of education and strength vis á vis the government, it can be argued that ZCTU was one of the most powerful trade union movements in Africa before 1991.¹ Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman General of ZCTU became the President of Zambia's Third Republic. Chiluba stayed in power until the elections held in 2001 and was then replaced by Zambia's present President Levy Mwanawasa. Many researchers thought that Zambia was a good example among new democracies in Africa, on track for democratic consolidation.

However, from the positive start in 1991, Zambia did not continue this way. Despite the change to a multi-party constitution, local and international observers argue that Zambia's democratisation progress stagnated half-way through the first election period.² Contrary to expectations, ZCTU's political influence decreased dramatically and MMD is turning more and more into an authoritarian party. According to the political scientist Lise Rakner, ZCTU has a marginal influence on contemporary policy debates.³ Next year, 2006, the Zambian people are heading for their fourth national elections, which make the case of ZCTU as a potential democratic force or not highly relevant.

This essay will analyse the changes in ZCTU's political influence from the time of Zambia's transition to a multi-party constitution until the elections held in 2001. Hopefully this will help us understand ZCTU's capacity to influence Zambian politics and contribute to the general discussion on what role organisations in civil society can play in democratisation after the transition from authoritarian rule.

¹ Rakner (1992) *Trade Unions in Processes of Democratisation. A study of Party Labour Relations in Zambia*, p. 6

² Rakner (2003), *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*, p. 117

³ *Ibid.* p. 176

1.1 Background of the Case

There are many reasons for choosing Zambia as a case in the context of this essay, but I will mention two. Firstly, because of the interesting paradox, where the multi-party constitutional reform weakened the influence of the trade union movement drastically rather than strengthened it, contrary to pluralist democratic theory. According to Rakner, pluralist democratic theorists argue that the power of labour would increase during political liberalisation “as democratisation is considered to favour large member organisations”.⁴ The studies that have been made on this topic though, usually conclude that the trade unions’ role as a strong democratic force disappears after the first transition.⁵ Zambia is not a unique case in this matter. Therefore it is relevant to further deepen the understanding of the circumstances that made the situation in Zambia develop as it did, *despite* the fact that Zambia had one of the strongest trade union movements in Africa.⁶ Secondly, the prospect of Zambia’s political development is quite dark in many aspects, but I hope to find some features that shed some light on the democratic forces that still fight for a change and hopefully will continue to do so.

1.2 Purpose and Research Questions Examined

The overall aim of this study is connected to a part of the wider research question suggested by Olle Törnquist, professor in political science at Oslo University; *how is it the case that interest organisations in civil society rarely play an important role after the transition from authoritarian rule or in democratic consolidation?* In other words; what are the pre-conditions that must be fulfilled, to enable such organisations to be integrated into the political system?⁷ Törnquist looks mainly at the democratic potential among civil society movements and focuses on what factors explain the shifting capacities of movements to politicise interests, that is to include them into politics. As pointed out by Beckman/Sjögren, a central theoretical issue according to Törnquist is what circumstances make a plurality of social movements translate into fragmentation or broad alliances as a main political tendency. This for instance, depends on whether the movements are able to connect to wider social projects or not.⁸ If movements translate into broad alliances around a common interest or

⁴ Rakner (2003), p. 19

⁵ See for instance Schmitter: “Civil Society East and West” in Diamond et al. (1997), *Consolidating the third world democracies. Themes and Perspectives*, p. 239-262

⁶ Note that well-organised and politically influential trade union movements are unusual elements in African societies. Apart from the Zambian case, it is almost only in South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria that the trade union movements have been strong enough to receive attention in studies on democratisation.

⁷ Törnquist (1999), *Politics and development. A critical introduction*, p. 133. Note that Törnquist’s focus is on democratisation in the context of ‘late development’ i.e in so called third world countries.

⁸ Beckman/Sjögren: “Civil society and Authoritarianism Debates and issues - an introduction” in Beckman et al. (2001), *Civil society and Authoritarianism in the Third World*, p. 18

ideology and link up with a political party or a local institution, they are more likely to have an impact on democratisation, according to Törnquist. Elements of Törnquist's theoretical approach will be used in order to see if those are fruitful to explain ZCTU's shifting role in the democratisation in Zambia.

The concrete aim is to give an account of what happened to ZCTU's political influence during the 1990's, mainly by looking at ZCTU's politicisation of interests and issues in 1991 and in 2001. The comparison over time will hopefully provide us with indications on the trade union movements' possible democratic impact in the elections in 2006. The comparison will also illustrate the changes in how ZCTU runs the workers' interests, depending on its capacity to adapt to or to resist political and economic reforms. The following questions will be analysed, as suggested by Törnquist;

- *Where does ZCTU find space for its work?*
- *What kinds of issues and interests does ZCTU choose to bring up on its agenda in order to promote democratisation?*
- *How does ZCTU include people into politics?*⁹

1.3 Limitations

Democratisation can be studied in many ways and it is of course impossible to cover all aspects that play a role in the complex process. This study is limited to a central aspect of democratisation, namely politics of democratisation or the ongoing process of how interests are politicised. This can of course also be studied in many ways, but as mentioned above, elements of Törnquist's theoretical approach with focus on democratisation from below will be used.

The movement in focus in this study is ZCTU, which consists of 20 registered national unions¹⁰ and is the largest trade union federation in Zambia. Earlier ZCTU was the only trade union federation, but in 1994 some unions split from ZCTU and formed a second federation, called the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Zambia (FFTUZ).¹¹ The main reason for choosing ZCTU is because the organisation is more established than FFTUZ and it also has more members and a greater bargaining power. ZCTU accounts for 90 % of the total trade

⁹ The questions will be elaborated on in chapter 2.6

¹⁰ A national union is in this essay defined as a single trade union, representing workers in different professions or work places such as MUZ, the Mine Workers Union of Zambia. Examples in Sweden would be *Lärarförbundet* or *Metallarbetarförbundet*.

¹¹ Kampe, K (2004-01), *Zambia*, LO/TCO Biståndsnämnd, quoted 2005-05-10

union membership base¹² The circumstances around the decreased political influence during the 1990's were different to each trade union affiliated to ZCTU, due to for instance what sector in the economy the union belonged to. Because of time constraints and lack of relevant information, a selection of single trade unions has not been made. However, none of the affiliated trade unions were considered 'winners' of the political and economic reforms in Zambia as they all lost members and funds. Therefore I do not think the decision to focus on ZCTU only, will give a misleading result.

The time period concerned is from 1990 until the elections held in 2001. I am aware that more than a decade is a long period to cover. But since politicisation is an ongoing process, some time has to pass before changes can be observed. This is also the main reason why the study ends with the year 2001; later observations would be too uncertain. The reason for beginning in 1990 is that a multi-party constitution was introduced and ZCTU's type of politicisation can be considered as rather successful. Of course, ZCTU was not the sole actor in that process, but other forces will only be mentioned briefly.

1.4 Outline of the Essay

Chapter two begins with a general discussion on how to conceptualise democracy and democratisation, followed by a wide presentation of the civil society debate in relation to democratisation in general and in the consolidation of democracy in particular. Thereafter we approach the theoretical framework that will be used in this study: post-Marxist. It has its point of departure in the criticism of theories on civil society and democratisation. The critique is deepened by Törnquist's theoretical approach on politicisation, which is presented in detail. *Chapter three* discusses the method and related advantages/disadvantages of this type of study, the validity/reliability problems and the material used. *Chapter four* presents the case by giving an account of the trade union history in Zambia and the particular strength of ZCTU, and continues with how the formation of MMD took place and how the multi-party constitution was introduced in 1991. The formation of MMD and the transition are analysed in terms of Törnquist's three aspects of politicisation. The chapter continues with giving an account of ZCTU's decreased political influence during the 1990's, MMD's development into a party with authoritarian manners, followed by ZCTU's politicisation until the elections in 2001, by applying Törnquist's three aspects of politicisation. *Chapter five* summarises the

¹² Nyirenda/Shikwe (2003), *Trade Union Country Report Zambia*, p. 20

main findings by comparing the politicisation in 1991 and 2001 as well as discussing ZCTU's possible democratic impact and future prospects.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Views diverge on how to interpret democracy. The definition we choose is not only crucial for the theoretical perspective of a study; it also has implications for the empirical analysis. In the context of this study, it is also important to have in mind what connections studies on democracy have to studies of development. According to Rudebeck, one reason for parliaments like the Swedish Riksdag and also many tax-payers to support democracy in other countries is that most of us think democracy contributes efficiently to the achievement of development, which in turn can be defined as “the alleviation of poverty, social and economic improvement”¹³. Rudebeck calls this an instrumental, pragmatic reason; “democracy as a means to development”¹⁴. There is of course no single causality chain between the two concepts; rather it is a very complex discussion as Rudebeck also points out. There is not space for a broader reflection here, but I want the reader to have the instrumental reason in mind in order to follow why democracy is defined the way it is in this essay.

2.1 What is Democracy?

One way to look upon democracy, according to Rudebeck, is in terms of “*universal suffrage, regular elections and basic civil rights*”¹⁵. The definition is often called minimalist and is predominant among modern political scientists (e.g. Samuel Huntington). Some advantages are that the minimalist definition facilitates comparative research and serves as an easy tool to distinguish democracies from non-democracies. But the minimalist definition only describes the political system *per se* and it also creates some problems. For instance, according to the minimalist definition a state is not undemocratic, even if the elected government is inefficient, corrupt, dominated by private interests and incapable of implementing policies demanded by the electorate.¹⁶ Many citizens in such an environment probably do not agree with the minimalist definition as a measure of their country being a democracy or not. Neither does the

¹³ Rudebeck: “On the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation” in Melin (ed.) (2002), *Democracy, Power and Partnership - Implications for Development Cooperation*, p. 3

¹⁴ Ibid. Rudebeck gives another reason which is the view that democracy is something valuable in itself, which he calls a *normative* or a *cultural* reason.

¹⁵ Rudebeck: “On the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation” in Melin (2002), p. 3

¹⁶ Huntington (1991), *The third wave - democratization in the late twentieth century*, p. 10

minimalist definition give any concern to the stability of a democratic political system. As Samuel Huntington points out, systems that are classified as equally democratic may differ a lot in their stability.¹⁷

Another way to define democracy, according to Rudebeck, is “*political equality in actual practice*”.¹⁸ This definition is called maximalist in this essay and is seen as a more ideal definition, denoting something that rarely exists anywhere in the world today. Nevertheless this interpretation probably is more common among the majority of citizens when thinking of the practical content of democracy. According to Huntington, the maximalist definition creates even more problems than does the minimalist definition. He notes that it is not fruitful for analysis since it is a normative ideal and that the efficiency or imperfection of democracy can only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other types of political systems.¹⁹ I agree with Huntington about the difficulties to operationalise so as to be able to measure democracy, but for democracy to make any sense in the discourse on politics and development, the maximalist definition can not be excluded. So how do we continue?

To overcome this dilemma Rudebeck suggests a two-fold conceptualisation of democracy, which consists of *democratic constitutionalism*;

rule based on universal suffrage, regular elections, legal guarantees for free discussion and opposition for everybody, the legally recognized right to associate and organize freely, and institutional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of power.²⁰

and *popular sovereignty*;

Shared power defined in terms of social contents, with regard to actual and effective participation in the making of decisions on matters of common concern and significance. This concerns the larger political system as well as daily social life, economic production, places of living and work, and local decision-making.²¹

According to Rudebeck, the two-fold conceptualisation shall be seen as “*two distinct but linked dimensions of actually existing democracy and ongoing processes of democratisation*”²². Following Rudebeck’s two-fold conceptualisation, democracy is not just a

¹⁷ Huntington (1991), p. 10

¹⁸ Rudebeck: “On the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation”, in Melin (2002), p. 4

¹⁹ Huntington (1991), p. 10

²⁰ Rudebeck: “Beyond Democratic Constitutionalism; on the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation”, in Williams (2004), *Democracy, Labour and Politics in Africa and Asia: Essays in honour of Bjorn Beckman*, p. 45

²¹ Ibid.

²² Rudebeck: ” On the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation”, in Melin (2002) p. 5

constitutional system; it also has an aspect of how the system is considered to function in the daily lives of people. If democracy is to be linked to development, I believe that the two-fold conceptualisation of democracy is needed. Democratic constitutionalism can be implemented from above but needs forces from below to be maintained and not misused. Popular sovereignty on the other hand can only be created from below. Since the meanings of democracy can not be separated from each other when studying forces from below, I will try to use the twofold conceptualisation of democracy in this essay.

2.2 Democratisation - not a Linear Process

A frequently used term in this essay is democratisation, which of course can be seen as a process leading to democracy. But it is important to distinguish the different ‘stages’ of democratisation as the forces lying behind can differ greatly, or in other words; circumstances that contribute to the basic establishment of a democratic constitution do not necessarily contribute to its consolidation. Briefly, according to Huntington, the different ‘stages’ involve the end of an authoritarian regime, the installation of a democratic regime and the consolidation of a democratic regime.²³

During the past decade, scholarship has been concerned primarily with democratic transition and consolidation. Democratic consolidation is hard to recognise or as Diamond puts it; “[...] it is easier to recognise the phenomenon in its absence [...]”²⁴. Few systematic efforts have been made on how to measure democratic consolidation, which partly explains the confusions around how to interpret its content. According to Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, democratic consolidation is reached when the democratic principles and rules are “the only game in town”.²⁵ Or to put it differently, democratic consolidation is reached when;

[...] a strong majority of the public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life [...]. *Constitutionally*, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.²⁶

²³ Huntington (1991), p. 35

²⁴ Diamond: “Introduction: in search of consolidation” in Diamond et al. (1997), p. xix

²⁵ Linz/Stepan: “Toward consolidated democracies” in Diamond et al. (1997), p. 15

²⁶ Ibid.

Some researchers, (e.g. Carothers) criticises the whole idea of the transition paradigm. From Carothers' point of view it is too linear and mistakenly assumes that once a country is moving away from dictatorship, it automatically is on its way towards consolidation. Zambia is a good example of that the critique against the linear transition paradigm is legitimate. The country was considered to be democratic at the time of independence, then an authoritarian regime took over for nearly two decades and today Zambia has a multi-party system with regular elections. But according to some political scientists, authoritarian features have re-appeared during the 1990's and the beginning of the 2000's (e.g. Rakner: 2003). Carothers argues that countries like Zambia are stuck in a "transitional gray zone"²⁷ and are "neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy".²⁸

2.3 Theories on Civil Society and Democratisation

What pre-conditions then, are needed in order for democracy to occur? In contemporary studies on democratisation, the impact of civil society receives much attention, despite the long history of the concept. Since the 1980's, civil society has been highlighted among many political scientists and its revival is generally seen as related to the political liberalisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980's and early 1990's. In spite of this, many scholars disagree on whether civil society is an analytical category only or also a useful tool for empirical research.²⁹ The main criticism against civil society as a tool for empirical research seems to be that the term has lost its analytical value due to its wide definition. It is easy to get confused when trying to find one's way in the jungle of definitions and no definition can be agreed to by all. A common way to define civil society according to Törnquist is as follows;

a sphere of what may be called self-constitution and self-mobilisation, aside from the family and independent of the state. It consists essentially of voluntary organisations and public (though privately controlled) communication. It is institutionalised through various rights vis-à-vis the state (but also upheld by the state).³⁰

Another definition is;

²⁷ Carothers (2002): "The End of the Transition Paradigm" in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No.1, p. 5-20.

²⁸ Ibid. More precisely, Carothers puts Zambia in one out of two common political syndromes in the "gray zone", namely "dominant-power politics".

²⁹ Sjögren: "State, Civil Society and Democratisation: Theoretical Debates Past and Present", in Beckman et al. (2001): *Civil society and Authoritarianism in the Third world*, p. 35 ff.

³⁰ Törnquist (1999), p. 94 f.

civil society is an arena where manifold social movements...and civic organisations from all classes... attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests.³¹

The common thesis on civil society, partly inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), is that an active civil society is a pre-condition for democracy and that civil society is a guarantee against authoritarianism. According to Törnquist, the common thesis also claims that “the stronger the civil society [...], the better democracy”³². Therefore, to favour democracy one should strengthen civil society against the state, as too much politics involved in civil society threatens democracy.³³ Hence, the common thesis inspired by de Tocqueville assigns civil society a positive and influential role in democratisation.

The problems with the Tocquevillian inspired definitions, if discussing the democratic impact of civil society, are that none of them take democracy within civil society or democratic aims into consideration. The social movements might be authoritarian, discriminating women or ethnic groups or they might use violence to advance their interests. As Boussard points out, Diamond proposes to exclude such organisations from the definition of civil society³⁴ which is a good way of overcoming the dilemma. But the main criticism on scholars such as Diamond or others supporting the common thesis still remains, as pointed out by Sjögren, since it is not about which organisations to include in civil society or not, it is their tendency to focus too much on civil society as a counterweight to the state. This turns the state and civil society into a dichotomy, rather than a framework for relational analysis of how state and civil society are separated and how they are united.³⁵

Törnquist is one among the critics of the common thesis, even if he considers civil society fine as normative concept. Törnquist believes the common thesis has too many theoretical weaknesses. His main criticism is that the concept sets aside power relations within civil society by assuming that all citizens are equal. Through his own field studies, he argues that theories on civil society and social capital are not fruitful as analytical tools in studies on

³¹ Rakner (1992), p. 29, quoting Stepan, Alfred (1988), *Rethinking military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, p. 3 f.

³² Törnquist (1999), p. 95

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Boussard: “Civilsamhälle och demokratisering” quoting Diamond, Larry (1994), “Toward Democratic Consolidation” in *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, No. 3, in Hydén (1998), *Demokratisering i Tredje Världen*, p. 155

³⁵ Sjögren: “State, Civil Society and Democratisation: Theoretical Debates Past and Present”, in Beckman et al. (2001), p. 38 f.

democratisation. Instead, Törnquist continues, the problem of democratisation is that of weak politics of democratisation. Weak politics of democratisation is the failure of civil-society organisations to link their specific interests to wider struggles for democratic rights.³⁶ In Törnquist's terminology the latter is about how an organisation chooses its type of *politicisation*, which we will have reason to develop further on.

Looking carefully one can see some similar features between Törnquist's point of view and Philippe C. Schmitter, according to whom a crucial factor for civil society to make any sense in democratisation is to look at in what way interests of different social groups are politically articulated and represented, and how their conflicts with one another and the state are solved. Furthermore, Schmitter argues that the degree to which interest organisations have scope, strategic capacity, and broad authority to speak and bargain for a whole class or sector is important and that civil society will tend to advance consolidation more under such corporatist arrangements, than under pluralist ones.³⁷ To my understanding, both Törnquist and Schmitter are of the opinion that civil society *per se* is not conducive to democratisation. They seem to believe that civil society may *contribute* to democracy, if fulfilling certain demands, but not *cause* it.

Some researchers argue that the democratic spirit and capacity of civil society may decline after the transition from an authoritarian regime.³⁸ Schmitter explains this partly with the increased competition about the political space, with political parties and more established interest groups taking center stage. In addition, people in general turn to private concerns, since they have more possibilities than before.³⁹ His conclusions are in opposition to pluralist democratic theories, where political liberalisation is believed to strengthen rather than weaken the capacity within civil society as mentioned earlier. The statement that the capacity among civil society actors declines after the transition from an authoritarian regime, agrees with the view that civil society is not completely independent from the state. This in turn, supports the criticism against the Tocquevillian inspired thesis that sees civil society and the state more as a dichotomy. Furthermore, as Akwete points out, one can argue that groups in civil society are dependent on the state for their functions and liberties, which means that the freedom, individuality and social justice associated with civil society, can only be secured within the

³⁶ Törnquist (1999), p. 135-142

³⁷ Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West" in Diamond et al. (1997), p. 249

³⁸ For further reading, see Smolar: "From Opposition to Atomization" and Schmitter: "Civil Society East and West" in Diamond et al. (1997), p. 239-277

³⁹ Diamond: "Introduction: In Search of Consolidation" in Diamond et al. (1997), p. xxxi

framework of legitimacy guaranteed by the state.⁴⁰ The latter is another argument for the ‘state/civil society approach’ in this study.

⁴⁰ Akwete (1994), *Trade Unions and Democratisation. A comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana*, p. 13

2.4 The Role of Trade Unions in Democratisation

The reasons why trade unions are chosen to represent civil society in this study are numerous. Firstly, trade unions usually function as collective interest organisations whose position in civil society and the economy put them in close relationships with governments.⁴¹ Therefore trade unions can be considered as highly relevant for the study of politicisation. Their special links to the state can be said to make them more capable than many other organisations to have an influence in democratisation, but it also makes them more vulnerable to changes in politics as the case of ZCTU will show. Secondly, organisationally trade unions generally have certain resource capabilities that differentiate them from other civil society organisations such as students, churches or women clubs. Usually they have a centralised organisational network, both at national and local levels, as well as a common history of struggles against political repression.⁴² Lastly, trade unions sometimes have the capacity to interrupt the whole economy in a country through work stoppages, which makes central trade unions an organisational power that is attractive to the political opposition.⁴³ What also makes trade unions interesting is that labour rights and freedom of association are commonly in focus on their agendas, which makes trade union interests concern a wider part of the society, even if union members only constitute a small part of the total population, as is the case in Zambia.

2.5 Post-Marxism, an Analytical Framework

Which is the most fruitful theoretical approach among the current schools of thought in the case of trade unions role in the process of democratisation, with point of departure in the critique of civil society? Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of many authoritarian regimes, the validity of the ‘grand old’ theories such as the modernisation or dependency theory has been questioned. Increasing numbers of scholars have become dissatisfied with narrow studies of markets, political institutions and forms of government and argue that one also has to analyse what happens in society. Also the ‘western’ perspective on many of those theories has been criticised.⁴⁴

A tendency in the contemporary debate is to focus more on broad analytical frameworks, looking at institutions and organisations within *both* state and civil society. According to

⁴¹ Akwetey (1994), p. 13

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Valenzuela, J. Samuel (1989): ”Labour Movements in Transitions to Democracy - a framework for analysis” in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 447

⁴⁴ I have mostly been inspired by Törnquist (1999), p. 38 f.

Törnquist, two recent and relevant such analytical frameworks, are the institutionalist perspective and the post-Marxist perspective.⁴⁵ The institutionalist perspective focuses on the rules of the game in the state and civil society that affect human action. Many scholars stress ‘good governance’, while for instance Robert Putnam talks of social capital and the ability to co-operate in society in his book *Making Democracy Work*, which has received much attention. Briefly, Putnam defines social capital as inter-personal trust, which in turn facilitates spontaneous co-operation within civil society.⁴⁶ As pointed out by Törnquist with reference to Putnam, such co-operation can be to agree upon sanctions against ineffective governments. Inter-personal trust is created if there is a vibrant and rich civil society with everything from football associations to choirs and democratisation is more likely to occur if co-operative movements and networking in civil society are supported.⁴⁷

The post-Marxist perspective is not easy to explain and it has also been criticised for not being uniform and for trying to ‘do everything at once’. However, it is fruitful in this study, especially since it focuses on the linkage between state and civil society. Note, by using the post-Marxist perspective, the aim is not to provide an explanation that is universally applicable; rather, it is to broaden the understanding of the case within an analytical context. Before arguing for the case, a description of what the approach includes, as I interpret it, will be presented.

Briefly, post-Marxists agree with the institutionalists on the importance of stable institutions but seek to combine the analysis of institutions with the analysis of material resources and social movements, which are not considered by institutionalists. Post-Marxists claim that material resources (such as taxes or copper income) and how they are distributed and mobilised, are important in explaining why organisations and different state institutions vary so much in efficiency and stability.⁴⁸ More important in the context of this essay is that post-Marxists stress the analysis of people’s interests and of actors like social and political movements, or as Törnquist puts it:

Given the present structural and institutional arrangements, after all, it is the movements and organisations that are able to change things.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Törnquist (1999), p. 38 f.

⁴⁶ Putnam (1993), *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy*, p. 167

⁴⁷ Törnquist (1999), p. 95

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 107

⁴⁹ Ibid.

The quote above does not mean that post-Marxists stress that such organisations in civil society are good *per se*. On the contrary, they argue that civil society is not necessarily equal and might have non-democratic demands (see also chapter 2.3). This is also the main post-Marxist criticism against Putnam's social capital theory. The social capital theory is also criticised for failing to explain how inter-personal trust would translate into democratisation and efficient democratic government.⁵⁰ Thus post-Marxists stress the need for links between civil society and the state, if democratisation is to occur and therefore often study democratisation from below. It is possible, according to post-Marxists;

[...] that certain new movements - and some of the old ones - will converge and become politicised, in the sense of taking the step from channelling a variety of interests and ideas to joining together to create a common political development project.⁵¹

Let us now take a look at what tools are needed in order to study how organisations can turn their interests into politics and apply this to the case study.

2.6 Politics of Democratisation - three Aspects

According to Törnquist, the majority of theories on civil society and democratisation fail to explain why popular opposition movements have so rarely been able to play an important role after the transition from an authoritarian regime. He bases his criticism on his own research on civil society organisations in Indonesia, the Philippines and the Indian state Kerala. All organisations that he studied had problems with unifying fragmented interests and actions, despite rather favorable pre-conditions such as considerably strong civil society and high level of social capital. To repeat, according to Törnquist the problem of democratisation is not about civil society *per se* or that of social capital. It is about weak politics of democratisation, or to put it differently; weak efforts to encourage people to unite around common interests and ideas, favoring democratisation. For civil society to become politically relevant and to make democratisation possible, Törnquist argues that links must be developed between different civil society groups as well as between them and other forms of political representation such as the state (a political party) or local authorities.⁵² Furthermore, many movements have functioned as a base for general grievances, but only temporarily. They have provided a platform for mobilisation but not a sustainable basis for organising demands. Törnquist states,

⁵⁰ Törnquist (1999), p. 139

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 114

⁵² Ibid. p. 142-150

that if the organisations do not continue to unite under more sustainable forms, the results will be ideological and organisational fragmentation. In turn, this might open up other ways of mobilisation, such as along ethnic lines.⁵³

The theoretical problem is *how* organisations in civil society link up with each other and *how* they link up with the state? *Where* do they find space for their work? *Which* interests do they choose to promote? Törnquist stresses that movements differ on their views about how the process of democratisation should take place.⁵⁴

2.6.1 Political Space

Let us start with the *political space*; or in other words; where does the organisation consider that there is space for pro-democracy efforts.⁵⁵ Törnquist believes it is most fruitful to study how the organisation itself reads the political space in the actual situation, rather than the space as such.

To begin with, in line with Törnquist's suggestions; one should find out whether the organisation considers that there is space enough for meaningful work or not inside the established political system (which in this essay is defined as formal political institutions such as the government/parliament). Second, whether it is possible and necessary to promote democratisation directly in civil society. Or perhaps the leaders of the organisation feel that they first have to create or capture a political party, democratise it and thereafter argue for the organisation's interests?⁵⁶ It seems to be more likely that problems to find space appear if the political system has restrictive or undemocratic laws. But it can also be difficult if the civil society is very vibrant and many voices are competing about space for their interests to be attended.

2.6.2 Political Inclusion

Secondly, how are people *included* into politics, or in other words; how do people come together to affect politics when they have agreed upon the space for their work?⁵⁷ Historically, following Törnquist and in general accordance with Nicos Mouzelis, one may distinguish

⁵³ Törnquist; "Movement Politics and Development: Preliminary Theoretical Notes on Some Concrete Cases in Kerala and Indonesia", in Beckman et al. (2001), p. 245

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 232

⁵⁵ Törnquist (1999), p. 153

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 155 ff. Törnquist uses a matrix illustrating organisations inclusion of members on p. 157.

between two ways to include people into politics; *integration* or *incorporation*. Incorporation is an ‘elitist’ inclusion of people by less firm and structured organisations into comparatively advanced politics, which is common in late-developing countries. Integration of people, on the other hand is when people are included into politics by autonomous broad popular movements created by economic development (common in Western Europe).⁵⁸ For this to make any sense, those concepts have to be elaborated.

Törnquist, following Mouzelis, sees incorporation of people as *clientelism* or *populism*. *Clientelism* is associated with bosses (or nowadays also the state) that despite the strength of the organisation as such, has the capacity to deliver patronage in return for votes or support. Törnquist adds that *clientelism* can be ‘modernised’ and is then called state-corporatism. To my understanding this means that key-persons within the government are what in general terms is called corrupted. *Populism* is characterised by charismatic leaders that are able to articulate popular feelings as well as ideas, but not always interests. The populist leaders are essential for the stability of the organisation by their ability to patronise followers.⁵⁹ To my understanding, both *clientelism* and *populism* presuppose strong leaders (or centralised leadership such as a government) who are usually not acting in line with democratic values.

Törnquist, in general accordance with Sidney Tarrow, distinguishes between two basic methods also when it comes to integration of people into relatively autonomous broad popular movements; *federative* and *unitary*. The *federative* method emphasises autonomous and collective action and is mainly based on peoples’ natural willingness to resist political repression by forming networks. The networks are usually not centralised. The *unitary* method is based on “the internalisation of actions and movements in organisations with some leadership”.⁶⁰ Törnquist’s explanation indicates that the *unitary* method often means a common political ideology and is more structured than is the federative. It also has a clear leadership with articulated demands. Common for both strategies are that they seem to respect democratic values or at least show solidarity. Additionally, Törnquist has a fifth way to include people that he calls *alternative patronage*. This is when leaders try to ‘cheat’ when integrating people, by adding elements of populism or clientelism.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Törnquist (1999), p. 155 quoting Mouzelis, Nicos (1986); *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*

⁵⁹ Törnquist (1999), p. 155 f.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 156 quoting Tarrow, Sydney (1994), *Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, p. 135 ff.

⁶¹ Törnquist (1999), p. 156

Important to point out and also confirmed by Törnquist's studies of for instance Indonesia, is that in order to get stability to the organisation and make it persist over time, members shall be included in a way that links the 'center' to the 'periphery'. In other words, the formally organised leadership with articulated aims has to be linked with the actual collective action on the grass-root level. This is called 'mobilising structures' and is a term used by Tarrow, and borrowed by Törnquist.⁶² In short, integration (*federative* or *unitary*), is a pre-condition for the 'mobilising structures' to occur.

2.6.3 Politicisation of Interests and Issues

The former two aspects; way of political inclusion and how an organisation reads the political space, often decide the type of politicisation. The type of politicisation in turn, shows if fragmentation of interests is more likely to occur and if so, probably decrease the organisation's impact on democratisation. Moreover, in line with Törnquist's discussion, it is important to note that politicisation is not enough for democratisation to occur, but makes it more likely.

Peter Gibbon among others has suggested some propositions that Törnquist uses as a point of departure in his analysis of politicisation. When Törnquist discusses Gibbon et al., it becomes evident that the definition of modern civil society first and foremost concerns the 'bourgeois' social division of labour. Their interests are usually coloured by privatisation and individualism. Important to note is that plurality of such groups is not likely to promote general interests and democratisation. Rather, the movements may be trapped in the process through the deepening of civil society, thus being unable to combine single issues/specific interests. But Törnquist thinks we need to be more precise and criticises Gibbon's et al. conceptualisation of politicisation for being both too narrow and too general, as it includes nearly all aspects of politics.⁶³

Instead, Törnquist suggests three aspects that need to be analysed before one can conclude on which type of politicisation is chosen by an organisation. To begin with, we shall look at *the basis of politicisation*, namely what kinds of ideas and interests that make people come

⁶² Törnquist; "Making Democratisation Work: From Civil Society and Social Capital to Political Inclusion and Politicization – Theoretical Reflections on Concrete Cases in Indonesia, Kerala and the Philippines" quoting Tarrow, Sydney (1994), *Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, p. 135. f in Rudebeck et al. (1998); *Democratization in the third world, concrete cases in comparative and theoretical perspective*, p. 131

⁶³ Törnquist (1999), p. 157

together. Törnquist differentiates two kinds of interests; single issues/specific interests or ideologies/collective interests.⁶⁴ To make this more understandable, a single issue can be a football club whose members want to expand their activity by starting up a team for women. A collective interest on the other hand, would be if the same football team participates in a wider democratic struggle that has a value for people also outside the club, for instance freedom of association (if that does not exist or is violated).

Second, *the forms of politicisation* relate to political institutions like the state or local governments. The forms vary according to whether the people that have come together 'only' demand that certain policies should be carried out by the state or if they also try to engage themselves, through self-management and co-operation with other movements.⁶⁵ *Forms of politicisation* are simply about whom the organisation considers responsible for carrying out its interests. Let us use the example of the football club again. Does the football club see the issue to start a women's team or to promote freedom of association, as a state/local government-matter only or do the members also try to do something themselves by linking up with other football teams to share funds etc.?

The *content of politicisation* is about the organisations' concrete interests or ideas, for instance human rights.⁶⁶ The *basis and forms of politicisation* is illustrated in the figure below and the *content of politicisation* can then be specified in the respective boxes. This is how ZCTU's way of promoting its interests in 1991 and 2001 will be characterised, by trying to place them in one or several of the boxes in the figure.

TYPES OF POLITICISATION⁶⁷

Forms of politicisation

Via state/local government only Also via self-management

Basis of politicisation

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 158

⁶⁵ Törnquist (1999), p. 158

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid. I have simplified the figure a little, without changing its purpose.

Single issues or specific interests	A	B
Ideology or collective interests	C	D

Törnquist specifies four types of politicisation. In box A there are organisations with specific interests with the aim to affect state and local government, since they are considered to be responsible or having the best possibilities to promote the specific issue. In box B, there are also organisations with specific interests in focus trying to affect state and local government, but they also work through self-management. In box C, we find organisations with collective interests trying to affect state or local government. Finally in box D, there are organisations with collective interests trying to influence the state or the local government as well as running their own business.⁶⁸

2.6.4 Törnquist's Ideal Type of Politicisation

Which box then, is the ideal situation for an organisation's democratising potential?

Törnquist's case study of Indonesia will serve as an example. His results show that the major actors' democratising potential did not vary directly with their strategic positions, when trying to include people into politics through integration. None of them were successful. Instead their failure depended on their type of politicisation, which was illustrated by placing them in the figure similar to that on the former page. Most organisations were found in boxes A and B, focusing on single issues/specific interests. However, the organisations became aware of the short-comings with this strategy and tried to agree upon general problems of democratisation instead. The mistake they did in the first place was to stay within their old strategic positions (political space) and then to relate 'their' issues or 'their' interests to general problems and ideologies. The organisations did not agree upon 'real' collective interests, influenced by democratic means beyond their own interests and they did not co-operate within a common political space. This led to conflicts between various groups and there was a tendency to hinder one another.⁶⁹ As I interpret it, Törnquist's ideal situation is when interest organisations have agreed upon a collective interest with democratisation influencing all the aspects of it (C or D in the model) and operate within the same political space. This makes organisations

⁶⁸ Törnquist (1999) p. 158

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 159 f.

avoid conflicting interests and the best is if they link the common interest with a political party as well as with civil society organisations.

3 METHOD

This is a qualitative case study based on literature sources. A qualitative study has the advantages that it avoids the blunt indicators that are sometimes necessary when studying many cases. It usually provides a deeper understanding of the research question examined which increases the validity. On the other hand the higher validity is reached at the expense of possibilities to generalise the empiric case. This however, does not mean that it is not possible to compare the case with similar countries. To illustrate the development of ZCTU's decreased political influence, a comparative perspective is used on ZCTU's politicisation over time.⁷⁰

My original plan was to make interviews with key-persons within ZCTU and a contact was established. This probably would have increased the validity since it would have enabled me to fill in gaps in the written material as well given an idea of ZCTU's current position which in turn would have 'lifted' the concluding discussion. Unfortunately we lost contact for some time and when it was re-established, the time schedule was too limited. Instead, recent newspaper articles have been used in order to get indications on ZCTU's current influence in democratisation.

3.1 Validity, Reliability and Generalisation

Validity problems are common in social science as processes such as democratisation are not possible to observe directly.⁷¹ In order to reach high validity it is therefore important to make sure that one measures what one strives to measure; namely in this study, the role of civil society in democratisation. Politicisation is of course only one way to study the role of civil society in democratisation processes and there are numerous other ways. Törnquist can be considered as a prominent researcher in the field of democratisation in the so called Third World and his field studies have verified his theoretical approach on politicisation, which gives reason to label them with high validity. Törnquist's approach turned out to be especially

⁷⁰ I have mostly been inspired by Assarsson/Svensson (1996), *Att fråga och att svara. En introduktion till statsvetenskaplig metod*

⁷¹ Assarsson/Svensson (1996), p. 6

fruitful in the case of ZCTU in Zambia when comparing the development over time. However, no qualified researchers that have criticised Törnquist have been found which perhaps would have changed some point of departures in the study.

Another aspect concerning validity is whether trade unions are ‘true representatives’ of civil society, due to their usually strong ties with the government. As will become evident later, ZCTU was created as an act of parliament during the one-party regime and was given financial resources as well as granted monopoly representation. However, from 1989 and onwards it is beyond all doubt that ZCTU had de-linked from the one-party government and opposed its policies. It also co-operated with other civil society organisations and was a genuine representative of labour. Therefore, ZCTU as a representative of civil society can be considered as correct, even if its relationship with the state has been dynamic.

If the measuring techniques include mistakes or give space for interpretations, even if one is sure about what is measured, a reliability problem has occurred. There is no guarantee that the material is correctly interpreted. In order to limit the risk, my ambitions have been to read as much as possible about the case from different angles.

The question whether a single case study can be generalised to cover a wider universe has been frequently debated. ZCTU is not a unique case when it comes to movements’ decreased political influence after the transition from authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, ZCTU’s fragmentation is special, since it occurred *despite* the fact that it was one of the strongest trade unions in Africa prior to 1991. This could make Zambia a ‘least likely case’ and thereby open up for generalisation. But since ZCTU’s marginalised political influence is not isolated to its type of politicisation, rather it shows one perspective of ZCTU’s shifting political influence; there is a need for further research in order to draw such conclusions. Making comparisons between countries with similar pre-conditions is of course welcome.

3.2 Discussions on Written Material

The study is based on literature from libraries in Uppsala and from the Internet. Chapter three is to a large extent based on Lise Rakner’s⁷² books *Trade Unions in Processes of Democratisation. A study of party labour Relations in Zambia* (1992) and *Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001* (2003). In my opinion it is hard to find a more

⁷² Rakner is Adjunct Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen.

prominent researcher in the field of this study. Rakner has carried out research in Zambia for more than a decade and in her latest book (2003) the results are based on qualitative interviews with 129 key informants, which she combines with quantitative data and observations. I therefore consider Rakner's conclusions being of rather high validity.

Other useful sources at the initiation of the study have been 'political guidebooks' in the wide field of democratisation in the so called Third world, which were of great help in order to study the 'state of art'. Mainly *Politics and Development - a critical introduction* by Olle Törnquist and *Demokratisering i Tredje Världen* by Göran Hydén have been used. There is a risk, when quite inexperienced on a subject, to 'swallow' all advice such books give you, even if they are supposed to be written in an objective and general way. However, this has been taken into consideration and a critical view has been maintained all through the study.

In several cases authors that in turn have quoted other sources are referred to in the text. There is a weakness in this kind of information, since it gives space for 'double' misinterpretations. In cases it has been impossible to check out the original source, such as ZCTU documents or interviews with key-persons, this problem has been solved by the use of other literature touching similar topics. In turn, this has enabled an insight in if the interpretations made have been reasonable. It has also been difficult to analyse political statements, since the relationship between the government and ZCTU often has been tense and most statements are coloured by this. However, priority has been given to ZCTU's perception.

3.3 Relevance of Theory

Theoretically, this study has its point of departure in the criticism of theories on civil society and democratisation. This does not mean that such theories are not fruitful. On the contrary, they are necessary in order to open up for such an approach as the post-Marxist analytical framework, since earlier studies on civil society in Törnquist's cases show that they did not give a satisfactory explanation. Since post-Marxism is a theoretical framework rather than a 'grand old' theory, the aim is not to generalise the results. Rather, the framework shall be seen as an analytical context, in which the study is approached to give a deeper understanding of the complexity of studies on politics of democratisation.

4 THE CASE OF ZAMBIA

A short background on Zambia's trade union history will be presented in order to give a deeper understanding of the particular strength of the trade union movement in Zambia and the major political and economic developments that had an impact on ZCTU's politicisation in 1991.

4.1 Short Trade Union History and Major Political Events 1964-1990

Trade unions have existed in Zambia since the 1930's when the copper mine industry was turning the country from an agrarian into an industrial economy. The unions were relatively well-organised as a consequence of their concentration along the Copperbelt. ZCTU was created by an act⁷³ of parliament when Zambia became independent in 1964. The ruling party, United National Independence Party (henceforth UNIP) created the act in order to ensure the implementation of its labour policy, aiming at rapid economic development and social justice, as was the policy aim after independence. UNIP supposed that ZCTU would be "a channel for communicating UNIP's policies to the workers";⁷⁴ hence ZCTU was first considered to be a part of the government and was given financial and organisational resources. This benefited the particularly united and strong trade union movement in Zambia in African measures, even if affiliation to ZCTU was not mandatory.⁷⁵ It can be argued that ZCTU was not a part of civil society at this time, as it was created by the government and was far from an autonomous organisation. Rakner supports this by stating that ZCTU was at the start an association of production that shared the goals of UNIP, rather than a genuine representative for workers. This is also mirrored by the workers lack of faith in ZCTU and unwillingness to be under party control which created internal conflicts.⁷⁶

Zambia was considered to be in a very good economic position after independence and was one of the wealthiest nations in Africa due to the high incomes from the copper industry. There were high expectations among workers on higher salaries and better working conditions. But as Zambia was dependent on one major commodity, the country experienced one of the worst economic setbacks in Africa, due to the fall in copper prices that began in 1973, in combination with increased oil prices. The country became highly indebted and as a

⁷³ The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act of 1964 (TUTDA)

⁷⁴ Rakner (1992), p. 77+7

⁷⁵ Banda (1997), *The trade union situation in Zambia. An overview of the law, practice and the way forward*, Chapter 1, p. 2

⁷⁶ Rakner (1992), p. 77 f.

result few demands from the workers were met and industrial unrest broke out.⁷⁷ UNIP tried to control the situation by passing the new Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (henceforth the 1971 Act)⁷⁸ which limited the independence of the trade union movement in many ways. Affiliation to ZCTU became mandatory and ZCTU was granted monopoly of representation, but had to pay for it as the right to strike became de facto illegal. UNIP's policy was "one union one industry"⁷⁹ which meant that it was not possible for a union to register if another union already existed in that industry. During the same period (1973) the Zambian multi-party constitution was changed to a one-party system. In order to hold trade union office or vote in an election, it thereby became necessary to be a member of UNIP. Rakner states that even if the trade union movement kept some of its organisational autonomy, the unions were bound by the one-party constitution since the party became the supreme organ of government.

There are divergent opinions on whether the 1971 Act shall be seen as positive or negative for the development of the trade union movement, among scholars as well as trade union members. Some point to the fact that mandatory affiliation to ZCTU and the policy of 'one industry one union' created a unified and strong trade union federation with a forceful bargaining power. Others are of the opinion that it was only a governmental strategy to control the trade union movement in order to strengthen UNIP's power over labour.⁸⁰ According to Darlington Banda,⁸¹ the 'one union one industry' clause had more advantages for labour than disadvantages as it "apart from strengthening trade unions [...] avoids the problem of multiple representation and it(s) associated disadvantages of inter union conflict, multiplicity of negotiations within the industry as well as the problem of overlapping membership".⁸² To my understanding, ZCTU's leadership were mainly positive to the consequences of the 1971 Act, and there is much to the conclusion made by Rakner;

Ironically, however, rather than gaining control over unions through state corporatist measures, the UNIP government instead created one of the best organised and financially protected union movements on the continent.⁸³

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 8

⁷⁸ Act. No. 36/1971

⁷⁹ Rakner (1992), p. 91 f.

⁸⁰ Rakner (1992), p. 91 f.

⁸¹ Darlington Banda is a University Lecturer at the University of Zambia and is specialised in Labour Law and Industrial Relations.

⁸² Banda (1997), Chapter 1, p. 4

⁸³ Rakner (2003), p. 50

The economic problems continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's and UNIP responded to the crises with measures like cutting subsidies on basic consumer goods, in order to reach a stabilisation agreement with the International Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF). The reduction of the subsidies led to increased food prices and caused inflationary pressure on the already low incomes among workers. Also a growing number of workers began to lose their jobs, mostly in the mines. Naturally, ZCTU was critical to UNIP's economic measurements and chose the side of the workers this time. According to Akwetey, thereby ZCTU took a first step against the rules of the state corporatist regime that it was still a part of.⁸⁴ Rakner's studies of ZCTU's own documents confirm that during the 1980's the trade union movement was the strongest opponent of IMF's economic reform measures.⁸⁵ Consequently, one may presume that ZCTU from now on can be understood as a reflection of the workers interests as a whole, even if disagreements between ZCTU and the national unions of course appeared at times. Rakner argues that from 1980 and onwards the trade union movement is autonomous and should be regarded as a civil society organisation.⁸⁶

To conclude, those events - UNIP's unintended organisational strengthening of ZCTU due to the 1971 Act in combination with the economic crises and the measures taken by UNIP which led to increased food prices, high rates of unemployment and huge inflation - increased the conflict between ZCTU and UNIP. The increased conflicts in turn slowly paved the way for the broad coalition of interest groups that resulted in the creation of Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) that turned the one-party constitution from 1973 into history on August 24, 1991.⁸⁷ Now we are approaching the core of the empirical part of this study.

4.2 The Change to a Multi-Party Constitution in 1991

This chapter will deal with the circumstances around ZCTU's participation in the formation of MMD and the introduction of a multi-party constitution in 1991, with reference to the three aspects suggested by Törnquist; *political space*, *political inclusion* and *politicisation of interests and ideas* (for repetition see Chapter 2.6). After the data collection has been presented, a separate analysis of each of the three aspects will be made.

4.2.1 Political Space - Empowerment in Civil Society and the Formation of MMD

⁸⁴ Akwetey (1994), p. 54 f.

⁸⁵ Rakner (2003), p. 59 quoting ZCTU (1986), "Report of the General Secretary to the 7th Quadrennial Congress".
Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat

⁸⁶ Rakner (1992), p. 129

⁸⁷ Rakner (2003), p. 64

The first analytical tool is *political space*; where does a movement consider that there is space for its work? Did ZCTU consider there was space for meaningful work within the established political system or was it possible and necessary to work directly in civil society? Or did ZCTU believe it first had to capture political instruments and thereafter facilitate its interests? The main point of departure in this chapter is the year before the parliamentary and presidential elections took place on October 25 in 1991, where MMD contested with nine other registered parties and won 125 out of a total of 150 parliamentary seats. The former Chairman General of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, became the President of the Republic of Zambia.⁸⁸ To illuminate how this happened we have to turn the clock back again.

In general accordance with Akwetey, what engaged ZCTU most during the 1980's was participation in government decision making, especially in industrial relations matters. Workers got increasingly dissatisfied with their lack of influence over the structural adjustment process which affected labour negatively. ZCTU in turn, was criticised by UNIP for not trying hard enough to control the workers that protested.⁸⁹ To my understanding, as ZCTU chose the workers side in the conflict and not UNIP's as mentioned earlier, UNIP realised that ZCTU was a possible threat. Consequently, ZCTU was denied representation on major institutions of industrial relations matters, or where such representation was guaranteed, the President had the power to choose representatives between 1981 and 1989.⁹⁰ The trade union movement reacted to this, by putting pressure on UNIP's economic negotiations with IMF through strikes in "all essential areas in 1985".⁹¹ For one year the government resisted, but the trade unions' protests increased and according to Rakner, the final end of the reform process came when UNIP made official that it intended to carry through a decontrol of maize prices in December 1986. This resulted in a huge outbreak of protests where 15 people were killed.⁹² Due to this, several strikes took place and UNIP reacted forcefully by giving directives to managers of companies to dismiss workers that were involved in striking. Furthermore, UNIP threatened ZCTU with dissolution if "it persisted in misguiding its members and associating with suspicious Western organisations offering undercover funds".⁹³ It is quite clear that ZCTU's former institutionalised space within the established political

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Akwetey (1994), p. 55+59

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 59 f.

⁹¹ Rakner (2003), p. 59 quoting Hawkins (1991), "Understanding the failure of IMF reform: The Zambian Case" in *World Development*, Vol. 19, No. 7, p. 839-849

⁹² Rakner (2003), p. 59

⁹³ Rakner (1992), p. 116, quoting *Times of Zambia* 29 April 1987

system, created by UNIP, was taken away step by step by the very same actor. Interestingly, this did not mean that ZCTU was not a force to count on anymore.

What then follows namely shows how influential ZCTU was in national politics, despite the exclusion from high decision making and despite the threats to workers involved in strike activities. Some researchers argue that Zambia's failure to implement structural adjustment policies can be explained by the strong resistance coming from trade unions (Akwetey 1994) The riots by workers namely led to the cancellation of Zambia's participation in IMF's structural adjustment programs and UNIP decided to do it alone instead (through the NERP -New Economic Recovery Programme, announced on May 1987).⁹⁴ This is important, as it demonstrates that UNIP agreed with ZCTU on the split from IMF, despite their conflictual relationship. The co-operation can be explained by the former close ties between UNIP and ZCTU as well as the fact that ZCTU was still strong enough to constitute a threat to UNIP's power. But the agreement between UNIP and ZCTU did not last very long, since NERP did not work out well. In the spring 1989, UNIP re-started discussions with IMF. This led to a new economic reform that resulted in a threefold increase in maize prices. Perhaps not surprisingly, ZCTU was negative to UNIP's decision to reopen the discussions with IMF.⁹⁵

How can this be analysed in terms of how ZCTU read the political space? The fact that ZCTU's riots had an impact on UNIP's policies (at least for some years) in forms of the agreement with UNIP in economic policies (NERP), indicates that ZCTU considered there was space for meaningful work within the established political system. But the space was limited which is supported by the fact that it was only temporary, as UNIP decided to reopen its negotiations with IMF in 1989. Concerning the political space within civil society, the restrictions on strikes due to the 1971 Act and the reprisals against workers, indicate that the space in civil society was also limited. Furthermore, Rakner states that the disappointment of the interest organisations shifted from IMF and food prices to President Kaunda and UNIP's economic policies by the end of the 1980's, which was a result of UNIP's continued measures that threatened the power of labour.⁹⁶ Naturally, this gave ZCTU incentives to reconsider how it read the political space.

⁹⁴ Rakner (2003), p. 59 f.

⁹⁵ Rakner (2003), p. 59 f.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 63

One example of measures taken by UNIP was a new legislation; the Industrial Act 1990 (henceforth the 1990 Act),⁹⁷ which was designed to block ZCTU's funding and break up its centralised structure. ZCTU saw it as a move by UNIP to weaken the trade union movement and stated that it was directed to the "total destruction of trade unions"⁹⁸ in Zambia. The discontent with UNIP's policies in general among workers and the public, culminated on December 30, 1989 when the General Council meeting of ZCTU took the historic decision to introduce a multi-party constitution and abolish the one-party state. According to Akwetey, this was the first time in ZCTU's history that the movement demanded a formal separation between the party, the state and ZCTU.⁹⁹ This is in line with the following ZCTU policy statement; "the trade unions and their workers have accordingly taken a decision to formally terminate all forms of sympathy and support for UNIP and its Government. [...]".¹⁰⁰ After the official demand for re-installing a multi-party constitution, other individuals and organisations with similar objectives met at a national conference in Lusaka in the middle of 1990. There were many different representatives such as business interests, intellectuals, commercial farmers, unemployed, churches and students and it was at this conference that MMD was formed as a mass organisation.¹⁰¹

In terms of political space, ZCTU's decision to cut its links with the corporative structures of UNIP indicates that it considered there was not much space for meaningful work within the established political system any longer. The decision was released by the 1990 Act,¹⁰² and was probably 'the match that lit the fire' after a series of labour-hostile policy decisions and actions taken by UNIP earlier. One can presume that it was not easy to find space for meaningful work within civil society either, as workers were harassed. Moreover, the introduction of the 1990 Act made ZCTU fear an increased number of trade unions in each industry and that it was likely to cause splinter tendencies¹⁰³ which UNIP could take advantage of. This shows that ZCTU was aware of the fact that the space within civil society could decrease and collective bargaining become more difficult if no actions were taken.

⁹⁷ Act. No 36/1990

⁹⁸ Akwetey (1994), p. 63, quoting ZCTU File 28/12/90. Policy Statement and Decision Taken in the Newly Enacted Industrial Relation Act of 1990.

⁹⁹ Akwetey (1994), p. 64

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. quoting ZCTU file March 19/03/91, Complaint to the ILO by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

¹⁰¹ Akwetey (1994), p. 64

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 62 quoting ZCTU File 28/12/90, Policy Statement and Decision Taken on the Newly Enacted Industrial Relations Act of 1990. December.

In order to avoid a weakening of the collective bargaining as well as to end UNIP's economic policies, ZCTU saw political intervention by the formation of a political party as the most fruitful way to alter the political system and promote democratisation. This indicates that ZCTU expected that it would be given space within the established political system. The strategy ZCTU used was to co-operate with movements within civil society; consequently they read that there was space for meaningful work directly within civil society. ZCTU was one of many other organisations forming MMD, but can be argued to have initiated the process of change, though the empowerment of civil society. Additionally, Rakner states that ZCTU functioned as a leading organisation in civil society.¹⁰⁴ This type of politicisation is most conducive to democratisation in line with Törnquist's theoretical approach, as different movements operated within the same political space and took the step into the established political system by the formation of a political party: however, it is not enough.

4.2.2 Political Inclusion by Unitary Strategies

The next question is; how do people come together to affect politics? To repeat, Törnquist suggests us to look at whether an organisation *integrates* (by *federative* or *unitary* strategies) or *incorporates* (by *clientelism* or *populism*) people into politics, or if the organisation uses a mixture of both; *alternative patronage*. People or members in the context of this study are trade unions affiliated to ZCTU. There are of course differences in the mobilisation strategies used by ZCTU to affiliate different trade unions as well as in each affiliated union's inclusion of individual members. Therefore, the results shall be seen as ZCTU's general way to include members and I believe this will be enough to find possible differences when comparing the inclusion over time.

The national trade unions were under close control of ZCTU and UNIP due to the 1971 Act as mentioned in chapter 4.1, as the act made member unions' affiliation to ZCTU mandatory and in order to hold trade union office and to vote, individuals had to be members of UNIP. This indicates that the modern form of clientelism in Törnquist's terminology; state-corporatism was used by UNIP to include ZCTU from 1971 to 1990. This statement is supported by the fact that ZCTU was given funds and guaranteed monopoly representation in return for restrictions in the right to strike.¹⁰⁵ If ZCTU was included into politics by state-corporatism, does this mean that ZCTU itself included the national unions by clientelism?

¹⁰⁴ Rakner (1992), p. 62

¹⁰⁵ Rakner (1992), p. 82

To repeat, Törnquist' associates clientelism primarily with; "bosses on different levels with their own capacity to deliver patronage in return for services and votes".¹⁰⁶ Nothing indicates that the ZCTU leadership had this capacity. Thus, clientelism as a strategy used by ZCTU to include members would only be the case if ZCTU was seen as a part of UNIP. In one way that is true, since ZCTU was incorporated into UNIP and initially was considered to be an agent of the government. But according to Rakner, it can not be said that the trade union movement as a whole was controlled by ZCTU and UNIP. Even if ZCTU was considered to be a state-controlled association, the national trade unions namely maintained some degree of organisational independence.¹⁰⁷ The trade unions' independence becomes evident as several conflicts between UNIP and ZCTU erupted throughout the 1980's. Rakner also states that the trade union movement since 1980 had used its funding and organisational structures autonomously and showed political and ideological differences compared to those of UNIP.¹⁰⁸ A contradicting statement is made by Neo Simutanyi at the Institute of African Studies;

In terms of union democracy, one trade union centre and compulsory affiliation have left the national unions with limited choice over alternative programmes and ideological perspectives. ...ZCTU has at times behaved in a similar manner to that of a one-party state and although the trade unions have been instrumental in the campaigning for democracy, they have operated in institutions that act as fetter to democracy.¹⁰⁹

What makes the picture even more complex is that UNIP ended its corporatist framework with ZCTU through the 1990 Act which was presented to the parliament in December, just after ZCTU had broken its alliance with UNIP. The 1990 Act had a great impact on how national trade unions were affiliated to ZCTU. It made it possible for unions to organise themselves without being tied to either the ruling party or to ZCTU. What is more, if a union wanted to use trade union funds in political campaigning or in support of a political party a two-third majority of the total membership was required. Consequently, a union could not automatically use its funding to support a political party. There were also positive changes with the act. For instance it made sure that illegal strike activity could no longer result in detention of workers. Nevertheless, according to the General Council of ZCTU, the 1990 Act was seen as a punishment from UNIP due to ZCTU's decision to de-link from UNIP. The General Council of ZCTU thought the main aim of the 1990 Act was to weaken the trade

¹⁰⁶ Törnquist (1999), p. 154

¹⁰⁷ Rakner (1992), p. 93

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 129

¹⁰⁹ Rakner (1992), p. 124 quoting Simutanyi, N, (1990); "Unions and the Democratization Process: The Case of Zambia". Paper prepared for the IAS/FES workshop on Economy and Democracy in Zambia, p. 14

union movement and called for a return to the guaranteed monopoly representation as was the case with the 1971 Act.¹¹⁰

ZCTU's will to return to the corporatist nature of the 1971 Act and Simutanyi's statement gives the impression that ZCTU was an undemocratic organisation with not much support from its affiliated unions. However, Rakner points out that ZCTU being protected from organisational competition, does not mean that it has not functioned as a democratic organisation, as organisational democracy is usually defined in terms of internal decision-making procedures and how the leadership selection is taking place. Competition between organisations is therefore not necessarily a reflection of the internal democracy of a movement. Rakner claims that the internal democracy of ZCTU to a large extent was maintained during the one-party regime and that the leadership's opposition to the 1990 Act shall not be seen as a defense for corporatism *per se*. Furthermore, she states that it is evident that the membership has maintained a certain degree of influence over the leadership.¹¹¹ The question is if we thereby can conclude that ZCTU used integration rather than incorporation at the time of MMD's formation?

The answer is a bit confusing. To begin with, the individuals and organisations behind the formation of MMD were united by their common opposition to UNIP and had a relatively strong leader in the Chairman-General Frederick Chiluba. Since MMD won the elections with a great majority, the opposition against UNIP was relatively widespread. In one way, Chiluba can therefore be said to have expressed popular feelings and ideas, which would make ZCTU's strategies to include members to a case of populism. If populism is the case, the leader should have a position that is "[...] essential to the stability of adjoining leaders and their ability to patronise followers."¹¹² This is probably not applicable to ZCTU's leadership, since ZCTU was considered to be a well-organised and internally democratic organisation. Rakner's personal interviews with leaders of national unions show that there was unanimous support for ZCTU and MMD in the process of political reform.¹¹³ This does of course not exclude populism from being the case. However, with reference to the general support for

¹¹⁰ Rakner (1992), p. 122

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 124 f.

¹¹² Törnquist (1999), p. 156

¹¹³ Rakner (1992), p. 67. However, Rakner stresses that there is a lack of statistical material and therefore it is not possible to present any definite conclusions, but that all information available indicates that ZCTU had strong support from its members at the time of MMD's formation.

ZCTU and MMD in combination with ZCTU's internally democratic structures, integration being the case becomes more likely.

Integration, emphasises people's natural and spontaneous willingness to resist oppression by forming federative autonomous networks (*federative*), or coming together in a more organised structure with a leader following a political ideology (*unitary*). The latter seems to apply to the case of ZCTU as its organisational structures were used in order to mobilise both trade unions and other movements to join MMD. This is also supported by the fact that ZCTU had cut its link with the corporatist structures of UNIP. Moreover, the initiative to introduce a multi-party constitution was taken by ZCTU. This shows that there was a clear political ideology. The mobilising role of ZCTU in the struggle for democratisation is pointed out by Aka Lewanika and Derrick Chitala, two of MMD's founders:

The ZCTU, which had been carrying out an open campaign for multi party democracy, was a critical institution in our struggle for democracy. [...], the ZCTU also possessed functional structures across the country which could be very useful in the campaign. Obviously, the ZCTU was an indispensable ingredient in the new democratic struggle.¹¹⁴

In terms of Törnquist's discussion in general accordance with Tarrow concerning the 'mobilisation structures', ZCTU's mobilising capacities indicate that the 'center' was linked to the 'periphery' as is important for organisations to be sustained. Before we make any conclusions, an important factor to mention is that the 1990 Act was not introduced until late December 1990, which had the consequence that it did not affect the affiliation of national unions immediately. Therefore, to my understanding all national unions were affiliated to ZCTU at the formation of MMD, though they now had the legal possibility to split from ZCTU if they wanted. Nevertheless, a unitary strategy seems to be ZCTU's way to include people into politics even if facilitated by former 'indirect' state-corporatism.

4.2.3 Politicisation by Common Interests

When ZCTU had decided on the space for its work and how to include people; which interests and issues were given priority on ZCTU's agenda? This in turn, illustrates if the formation of MMD was only a spontaneous expression of dissatisfaction with UNIP's policies, or if it was a more systematic form of engagement and interest representation. To repeat, the type of

¹¹⁴ Rakner (2003), p. 64 quoting Lewanika/Chitala (1990), *The Hour has come! Proceedings From the National Conference on the Multi-Party Option*, p. vi

politicisation determines if the overall result will be ideological and organisational fragmentation.¹¹⁵

According to interviews with trade union leadership made by Rakner as well as by Akwetey, the majority of the labour representatives were very sure both about what they wanted and what they did not want as they decided to join MMD. The respondents pointed out two reasons for reintroducing a multi-party constitution by changing the 1973 Constitution. They thought trade unionism works better under political pluralism and that UNIP's economic policies had devastating effects on labour's interests.¹¹⁶ In short, one can say that ZCTU was *pro* political pluralism and *against* UNIP's economic policy. Even if these interests would enable workers' interests to advance, they had the nature of collective interests, as the opposition against Kaunda was widespread. Rakner points out that ZCTU and the national trade unions became politicised and formed a national opposition movement promoting interests beyond those of unionised workers.¹¹⁷

Interestingly, the two reasons given by the respondents can be said to be both short-term *and* more systematic and long-term. As ZCTU's affiliation to MMD was done in order to get rid of UNIP and its economic policies, MMD can be seen as a temporary base for general dissatisfaction as the opposition against UNIP was strong. The second reason; that unionism works better in a competitive political situation, shows that the multi-party constitution was something ZCTU wanted to maintain. The latter indicates that it was a more systematic form of engagement and interest representation. Furthermore, the fact that ZCTU had disagreements with UNIP already in 1980 demonstrates that the process towards an end of the one-party regime and commitment to MMD was far from spontaneous and temporary. However, this line of argument is challenged by a statement from the Assistant General Secretary of ZCTU in an interview made by Rakner in June 1990: "when another party forms a government, labour will move back to its normal role of a trade union movement".¹¹⁸ Further, it was stated at the 8th Quadrennial Conference in October 1990: "[...] Strong and independent trade unions provide the most effective protection to the exercise of normal democratic rights in Zambia".¹¹⁹ When reading Rakner (1992) it is beyond all doubt that

¹¹⁵ For repetition see chapter 2.6

¹¹⁶ Rakner (1992), p. 58, and Akwetey (1994), p. 64

¹¹⁷ Rakner (1992), p. 67

¹¹⁸ Rakner (1992), p. 59

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 58 quoting Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Resolution at the 8th Quadrennial Congress 20-28 October 1990, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat, 1990

ZCTU and its affiliates stressed their autonomy and the temporary nature of their affiliation to MMD. However, ZCTU's temporary affiliation to MMD is not equivalent with a temporary commitment to the collective interests. Regardless of ZCTU's commitment to MMD, the problem seems to be that the collective interests were not long-term.

To conclude, ZCTU used MMD to promote labour interests by uniting around collective interests; *pro* political pluralism and *against* UNIP's economic policies. ZCTU and its affiliates did not have any collective interests more than those and furthermore, no outspoken plans to support MMD after these aims were reached. Yet, it was not a spontaneous expression of grievances as ZCTU actively had taken a stand against UNIP's economic policies already in the early 1980's. Instead, one can say the 'wider social project' which ZCTU supported in favour of labour, was temporary. Once the interests were promoted, there were no continuing collective interests such as what would replace UNIP's economic policies. Törnquist discusses a similar dilemma and argues that the problem is that organisations usually provide a platform for mobilisation but not a sustainable platform for organising demands. If the organisations do not continue to unite under more stable structures, the result will be ideological fragmentation. Let us now conclude this chapter with the *forms of politicisation*.

Who would be responsible for carrying out the interests? Prior to the elections in 1991, it was stated by all labour representatives interviewed by Rakner that after the multi-party constitution was introduced, the unions would return to mainly work in line with the economic interests of their members.¹²⁰ This has always been the trade unions' major concern. If the two collective interests mentioned above are considered, MMD was seen as the actor making it more likely for the interests to be promoted. That was, so to say the actual aim implied in the formation of MMD as a new constitution was needed in order to challenge UNIP's economic policies. Since ZCTU was the only organisation with a country-wide organisational base, it probably saw itself as responsible for the 'making' of the opposition movement. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal was to capture the government which indicates that ZCTU saw MMD *per se* as main responsible for implementing its interests, even if ZCTU temporarily constituted a part of it. It was also stated by all labour representatives interviewed by Rakner, that if MMD was to become the new government, the 1990 Act was expected to be revoked and employment opportunities created.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Rakner (1992), p. 75

¹²¹ Rakner (2003), p. 103

4.3 The Decline of Labour's Political Influence During the 1990's

This chapter is based mainly on Rakner's book *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*. To begin with, it aims to describe MMD's steps towards a more and more authoritarian party during the two election periods following the elections in 1991. This is done, because it is necessary to introduce the context in which ZCTU's declined political influence took place, in order to give a satisfactory understanding of its democratising impact. Secondly, ZCTU's role around the year 2001 will be described, with reference to the three aspects as suggested by Törnquist; *political space*, *political inclusion* and *politicisation of interests and ideas* (for repetition see Chapter 2.6). After the collected material has been presented, each of the three aspects will be analysed separately.

4.3.1 MMD - an Authoritarian Party?

According to the 1991 election manifesto MMD promised to engage in consultations with the major interest organisations, contrary to UNIP's earlier exclusions of ZCTU from participation in higher decision making. MMD also promised to create a "new constitution based on the principles of consensus and the active participation of the Zambian people".¹²² Furthermore, the Manifesto stated that:

MMD works on the basis of profound democratisation of inter-party relations. The MMD upholds democratic principles such as electiveness and replaceability, openness and accountability, non-subordination of the minority to the majority, and the right of the minority to defend its interests publicly if these interests should be threatened.¹²³

In spite of the Manifesto, already soon after MMD came to power, MMD began to re-install policies similar to those under the one-party regime and ignored the wishes of major interest organisations such as labour. One explanation for this, according to Rakner, is that MMD initially functioned as a loosely structured coalition as it represented many different interests. MMD had to accommodate both the main interests within MMD and the financiers of the electoral campaign. This in combination with the fact that MMD initially lacked institutional ties to the bureaucratic structures, resulted in that each ministry was given a great deal of autonomy in order 'to make things happen'. This led to splinter tendencies within the party and as a consequence MMD decided to re-install state of emergency laws on March 4, 1993. This legislation was very unpopular among the Zambian citizens due to the fact that MMD

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid. p. 103 f. quoting Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) *Party Manifesto 1991-1996* (1991:11)

had taken a stand *against* such legislation in its election campaign. Now MMD used its parliamentary majority to implement the same kind of legislation again, which was a first step towards similar political mal practices as those of UNIP.¹²⁴

A second event, also in line with authoritarian manners, was the consequences of the political conflicts within MMD about the control of the party. The conflicts were between former UNIP veterans and younger politicians entering the political arena in 1991. In the 1993 by-elections, the UNIP veterans received more prominent positions in the Cabinet after unexplained reshuffles of the younger politicians. Differences of opinions within the Cabinet often were not tolerated and Rakner states that the 1993 by-elections for the first time signalled that MMD was regressing from its democratic agenda. The ‘generational power struggle’ continued and in 1994, some younger politicians protested and wanted to remove the UNIP veterans from their positions. Their aim was to put MMD back on a ‘democratic track’ again, but the younger politicians were accused of trying to advance personally and not being ‘true Zambians’. Two deputy ministers, belonging to the group of young politicians opposing MMD’s non-democratic manners, were dismissed from the Cabinet. MMD gave no explanation for why this was done.¹²⁵ This also shows that MMD did not want to enter public debates to explain their policies.

The most evident example on MMD’s misuse of the political liberalisation was MMD’s handling of the constitutional amendment process in 1995. One of MMD’s most prominent promises during the election campaign in 1991 was namely to change the Zambian constitution in order to “offer stronger protection of civil liberties and ensure de-linkage of the party and the government”.¹²⁶ In late 1993, a review commission gathered views from the public and proposed a new constitution in line with this. The commission also recommended a national referendum and released the constitution proposal to the government in 1995. Contrary to the commission’s suggestion, the government did not arrange a referendum. Instead, MMD added a clause in the constitution, requiring both parents of presidential candidates to be Zambian’s by birth. This excluded MMD’s greatest threat Kaunda from the Presidential contest, since his parents were born in Malawi. As a consequence, huge public protests by civil society groups and opposition parties broke out. On May 28, 1996, the new constitution was nevertheless signed by the President. As a result, by June 1996, some major

¹²⁴ Rakner (2003), p. 105 ff.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Rakner (2003), p. 105 ff.

NGOs, opposition parties, the international donor community and others concluded that the process of democratisation that began in 1991, by the year 1996 had been abandoned.¹²⁷ These three examples are only some among many moves MMD did during the 1990's that disregarded democratic values.

As a consequence of MMD's constitutional amendments, the second election period in 1996 were boycotted by UNIP and some other parties. This resulted in MMD competing with only a few small parties and managing to capture 131 out of 150 parliament seats. Not surprisingly, the elections were not considered legitimate. A positive thing, however, was that the re-elected government had to start to regain democratic credibility in early 1997, since the international donor community had cut its support due to MMD's authoritarian manners. But it did not change much and the conflicts between the opposition and MMD increased. The political tensions escalated as the time for the 2001 elections came. Again, the conflicts concerned the constitution of 1996, where it was said that the President could only sit for two terms. Nevertheless, MMD wanted a referendum about a possible third term. The debate resulted in the reshuffle of Cabinet ministers that opposed the third term in February 2001, even if Chiluba never officially stated that he wanted to contest for it. The third term proposal was met with massive and well-organised protests from the Zambian people, which according to Rakner indicated that Zambian civil society still had some strength and organisational capacity. The protests led to Chiluba's withdrawal and Levy Mwanawasa became MMD's new Presidential candidate. The 2001 elections gave MMD lower support than ever. In 1996 they had approximately 87 % of the parliament seats and in 2001 only 50 %.¹²⁸

Another interesting aspect of the 2001 elections is the content of the party programs. They indicate that the political opposition parties operated within a limited political and ideological space, since none of them offered an alternative agenda in terms of economic policies. They all accepted structural adjustment programmes and did not support the protection of local industries or controlled exchange rates etc.¹²⁹ According to Rakner (2003), this may explain why labour did not manage to link up with any political party during the last elections, which leads us to the next chapter.

4.3.1 Decreased Political Space due to Political Pluralism

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 108 f.

¹²⁸ Ibid. p. 113 ff.

¹²⁹ Rakner (2003), p. 127

As has become evident, MMD did not stick to its 1991 Manifesto. Contrary, the party ignored ZCTU and other main interest groups as it started to consolidate its political power-base from 1993 and onwards.¹³⁰ An example of MMD's non-consultative attitude especially against labour, was the structural adjustment programme agreed to with IMF and the World Bank already soon after 1991.¹³¹ As foreseen by ZCTU, the economic reforms had no winners among labour as was also the case during the UNIP-era. Despite MMD's non-consultative attitude, the party managed to be re-elected in 1996 as well as in 2001. How is this possible and how did it influence the way ZCTU read the political space?

Let us start with the simultaneously implemented political and economic reforms during the 1990's. Rakner points out that political pluralism usually leads to new freedoms of association which in turn creates more organisations. Moreover, new freedoms of speech will make it easier for the organisations to have a voice. Logically, in Zambia, the introduction of the multi-party constitution led to a great number of new political parties (36 in total between 1991 and 2001) and several new NGOs.¹³² However, instead of having a positive impact on labours' political influence, the result was a 'crowded' civil and political society which made it difficult for labour to put forward their interests. A ZCTU representative expressed the frustration with regard to finding its place in the new environment in the following way;

We have voiced our concern. We have had discussions with government prior to the liquidation of UBZ and Zambia Airways. They said their airline would not be liquidated, then something happens... Chirwa or Shamenda [General Secretary and President of ZCTU] goes to the press. The same day one person from one of the 35 opposition parties defects to MMD and that steals the new headlines. Due to this crowded public agenda, people and our members think we are not doing anything, but that is wrong. But we have to appreciate that the environment has changed. Before it was only UNIP and ZCTU... Now there are a lot of NGOs and political parties. The result is that there is more competition for our voice to be heard. Before, even the law [labour legislation] was assisting us.¹³³

Secondly, concerning the economic reforms; political pluralism is expected to create problems for a government that wishes to implement economic reforms that from the beginning have a negative effect on major interest groups, since the government needs their support in order to be re-elected.¹³⁴ MMD managed anyway and Rakner explains this with the so called 'honeymoon' period. It means that a transitional government attempting to implement

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 103

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 68

¹³² Rakner (2000:3) *The pluralist paradox The Decline of Economic interest Groups in Zambia*, p. 2

¹³³ Rakner (2003), p. 119 quoting personal interview with Alfred Mudenda, 3/12/96, Assistant General Secretary (Administrations) ZCTU, Kitwe

¹³⁴ Rakner (2000: 3), p. 2

unpopular economic policy changes and at the same time deepen the political reform process, must implement them immediately, when the electorate is not yet 'aware' of the situation and thereby can not hinder it. This is what MMD did.¹³⁵ Therefore, it was not until late 1993 and onwards, that the trade union movement became a strong opponent to the economic reforms, when the effects of privatisation became evident in terms of huge job redundancies.¹³⁶ Before, ZCTU accepted the need for the reforms in general but was critical to the government's non-consultative attitude towards labour that stopped them from influencing the pace of the reforms.¹³⁷ As a result, ZCTU tried to act by visiting the World Bank and IMF in December 1993. The aim was to lobby in order to let the economic reforms be implemented gradually. The minister of labour reacted to this by saying that "the trade unions should stop acting as a shadow government as in a democracy, trade unions were only one of many interest associations".¹³⁸ This statement also shows that MMD did not want to consult with ZCTU anymore. Another example was in 1995, when the President of ZCTU made a statement to the press, indicating that ZCTU would take the role of an opposition movement again, since there were no strong opposition parties. In response, a representative from MMD accused ZCTU of "living in the past, and like a dinosaur, being unable to adapt to a new policy environment".¹³⁹ These two examples illustrate how political pluralism changed state/labour relations, as compared to prior to 1991, when ZCTU was considered a threat against UNIP's power.

In the second election period (1996-2001) the institutionalised relationship between the government and major interest groups (such as labour) established during the one-party regime came to a complete stop. According to Rakner, this can be explained by the continued economic adjustment policies in the 1990's, which contributed to the decline in employment levels in all sectors. As a consequence, trade union membership also declined. In 1990, the total trade union membership was about 350 000 and in 2001 there were less than 250 000.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, trade union density during the 1990's and after is around 50 % compared to 70 % and 80 % in the 1980's.¹⁴¹ This made it less important for the government to consult with, or consider the interests of trade unions, as they did not represent a significant electoral base

¹³⁵ Rakner (2003), p. 15, 81 f.

¹³⁶ Ibid. p. 96

¹³⁷ Ibid. p. 82

¹³⁸ Ibid. p. 95

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 119

¹⁴⁰ Larmer; "Resisting the State; the trade union movement and working class politics in Zambia 1964-91" Interview with Austin Muneku in Zeilig et al., (2002); *Class struggle and resistance in Africa*", p. 117. The time of the interview is not mentioned, but according to the content it must have been made during 2002.

¹⁴¹ Nyirenda/Shikwe (2003), p. 19 quoting Z.C.T.U. (2002), *Trade Union Membership Survey. Kitwe*

anymore. Additionally, no links were formed between ZCTU and the established political system as Rakner's conclusions show;

[...] no links were formed between Zambian economic interests and the party system. [...] No party offered an agenda that challenged MMD's economic reforms, and, as a result, the interest groups representing business, labor and agriculture had few channels into political decision-making arenas.¹⁴²

How can all this be understood in terms of how ZCTU read the political space? Obviously, ZCTU did not consider there was much political space available within the established political system. There was simply no party offering an alternative agenda, in terms of economic policies. The relation between MMD and ZCTU seems quite clear, from labour's point of view. In the December 27, 2001 elections, the support for MMD was lower than ever. MMD's president candidate Levy Mwanawasa won with only 29 per cent of the total vote and beat his rival with only 34 000 votes.¹⁴³ According to Muneku, a resource person and economic researcher at ZCTU, the support coming from labour was weak.¹⁴⁴ ZCTU's President Leonard Hikaumba confirms that ZCTU's stand against MMD has persisted in a speech on Labour Day this year;

President Mwanawasa has run away from us and we will run away from him when he comes to canvass for votes. [...] The question is, I wish the President was here, in this country do we really matter as workers? We would want the political leadership to answer what wrong workers have committed to be treated in this manner, to be exploited and marginalised¹⁴⁵

What about the political space within civil society? The political space in theory was more open at the time of the 2001 elections, since the multi-party constitution allowed freedom of association, but ZCTU itself considered it too crowded in practice. To sum up, paradoxically, it seems as if the political space as it is read by ZCTU has decreased after the multi-party constitution was introduced. It is quite remarkable that the former so influential labour movement could lose its position so rapidly due to political pluralism and MMD's continued economic negotiations with IMF and the losses in trade union membership that followed. This indicates that there must be something more to it. Could ZCTU have done something to avoid it? How is it that ZCTU did not decide to re-take its political influence by forming a party of

¹⁴² Rakner (2003), p. 16 f.

¹⁴³ Ibid. p. 15

¹⁴⁴ Larmer, "Resisting the State; the trade union movement and working class politics in Zambia 1964-91" Interview with Austin Muneku in Zeilig (2002); p. 117. The time of the interview is not mentioned, but according to the content it must be during 2002.

¹⁴⁵ Mupuchi/Kabwela, "Levy has run away from us-Hikaumba" in *The Post* 02/05/2005 quoted 03/05/2005

its own as it itself suggested in 1995? Let us see if the changes in political inclusion and politicisation of interests can help us to understand the whole picture.

4.3.2 Political Inclusion by Unitary Strategies, the Lack of “Mobilisation-Structures”

The way ZCTU includes members into the organisation has to be understood from a number of labour legislative changes made during the 1990's. In 1993, the 1990 Act was temporarily changed¹⁴⁶ and the 'one industry one union' clause was re-implemented, though affiliation to ZCTU was still optional.¹⁴⁷ However, the clause was in conflict with the new *Zambian Constitution* guaranteeing freedom of association, allowing multiple trade union centres. Later it was also in conflict with the international labour conventions that the *Zambian government* ratified in 1996, e.g. the ILO's conventions 87 and 98 (dealing with freedom of association and the right to organise and collective bargaining) as a consequence of pressure from the international donor community. Therefore, the 'one union one industry' clause was lifted and replaced by the *New Labour Relations Act of 1997*, implemented by MMD which ZCTU perceived as another try by MMD to weaken the trade union movement.¹⁴⁸ One of Rakner's respondents explains the consequences for ZCTU of the changes in labour legislation in this way;

Chiluba and his contemporaries did not have to organise, they were handed everything on a silver platter. In sum unions most [now] learn to live without the help from the law... They [unions] must devise better ways to organize themselves and bargain more aggressively.¹⁴⁹

This of course put ZCTU in a completely different position. Since it did no longer receive funds from the government and at the same time was loosing members due to job losses, ZCTU's financial capacity was weakened. Furthermore, the *New Labour Relations Act of 1997* opened up for multiple trade union federations. This led to some unions deciding to disaffiliate from ZCTU, e.g. the *Mine Workers Union (MUZ)* in 1994. MUZ had changed from a negative stand on privatisation to a positive one at the time when ZCTU was very negative to the economic policies of MMD.¹⁵⁰ MUZ namely represented a sector that was expected to grow after privatisation and therefore wanted to speed up the pace of the privatisation.¹⁵¹ There were also internal splinter tendencies within ZCTU in combination with

¹⁴⁶ Through The Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993, Act no. 27/1993

¹⁴⁷ Banda (1997), Chapter 1, p. 5

¹⁴⁸ Rakner (2003), p. 118

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 119 quoting personal interview with Robinson Sikazwe, 28/11/96, Regional Consultant (Africa), Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), Lusaka

¹⁵⁰ Rakner (2003), p. 97, quoting *The post*, October 29, 1993

¹⁵¹ Rakner (2003), p. 97 f.

leadership conflicts between those pro and those against privatisation. Consequently, four other unions declared that they wanted to leave ZCTU and those were the most significant members of ZCTU in terms of influence and size and therefore also were the major financiers of ZCTU. The private sector unions claimed that ZCTU spent its finances primarily on public sector unions. Commercial workers felt that they had fought their struggles alone and questioned why they should give 30 per cent of their trade union fund to ZCTU. Thus in 1998, a second trade union federation was founded, the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Zambia (FFTUZ). Even if for instance MUZ re-affiliated to ZCTU in 1999, ZCTU's strength was reduced.¹⁵² A labour representative stated;

[...] The problem is that there now is a government that deliberately ignores the unions and deliberately clips the strength of the unions...I think the government will make sure reconciliation is not taking place and I can see a new federation being recognized with a national centre that will most likely declare its sympathy to MMD.¹⁵³

After MUZ and the other unions' disaffiliation from ZCTU, Rakner claims that MMD used the split in order to facilitate its own interests. It was possible since MMD had extensive knowledge about the trade union movement through Chiluba that was the former General Chairman of ZCTU.¹⁵⁴ In line with this argument, the relationship between MMD and the splinter unions, mainly MUZ, improved.¹⁵⁵

Another consequence of the splinter tendencies within ZCTU, according to Adrian Shikwe, Deputy Director of Research at ZCTU, is that they have weakened the trade union solidarity as splinter unions sometimes have conflicting demands. Due to this fragmentation, common industrial action does not give any results as not all members will participate since they belong to different trade unions. Another problem according to Shikwe is that attempts of ZCTU to unify fragmented small unions, especially those in the same industry have not been fruitful as some trade union leaders are afraid to lose their positions if they unite. Therefore they rather struggle as small unions. Shikwe calls this development "personalisation of organisations"¹⁵⁶ and see it as an obstacle for a strong and united trade union movement. The small unions namely have no other capacity than representing workers at work places and thereby focus on specific interests.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid. p. 99 quoting an interview with Robinson Sikazwe LO/ZCTU

¹⁵⁴ Rakner (2003), p. 16

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 122

¹⁵⁶ Nyirenda/Shikwe (2003), p. 30

How can this be understood in terms of political inclusion? In Törnquist's terminology, incorporation can not be the case, since the leadership of ZCTU did not patronise followers nor articulate popular demands or ideas. Remaining is *unitary*, *federative* or *alternative patronage*. Since the trade unions became fragmented and were no longer united by a clear political ideology, it is tempting to state that ZCTU did not include members by *unitary* strategies. But it was not *federative* either, as the federation was still structured, even if some internal leadership conflicts appeared. The federation can not be considered to constitute a broad alliance of people's spontaneous willingness to resist oppression. Rather, ZCTU's way of including members was still *unitary* in 2001, however, with an unclear ideology. The decline in trade union membership and the national unions' organisational proliferation indicates that ZCTU's ability to link the 'centre' with the 'periphery' became weakened. Furthermore, Nyirenda/Shikwe points out that ZCTU in most cases is not directly involved in the running or decision making structures of their affiliated.¹⁵⁷ It also seems as if the constant re- and disaffiliation to ZCTU has made continuity and a united ideology difficult to maintain. This also indicates that the *unitary* strategy is blurred by divided interests, which leads us to the next section.

4.3.3 Politicisation of Interests and Issues in a Context of Privatisation

Let us look at the *content of politicisation*, or in other words if ZCTU focuses on single issues/specific interests or ideologies and common interests.

As mentioned in the former chapter, the two main collective interests/ideologies spearheading the formation of MMD did not create a long-term united agenda. With hindsight, one observer argues; "[t]hose who opposed President Kaunda knew what they did not want. They were less certain about what they did want".¹⁵⁸ This is one way of explaining how it was possible for MMD, despite ZCTU's strong opposition to the economic reforms prior to 1991, to promise in its campaign to implement a structural adjustment program.¹⁵⁹ ZCTU, namely, only agreed that it was against UNIP policies, not what was going to replace them. It is also stated by Rakner that MMD never was a labour party; rather it was a coalition of interests. Whereas MMD's organisational strength came from ZCTU, its financial strength came from the business community and commercial farmers, which gave them a large influence on MMD's

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 22

¹⁵⁸ Rakner (2003), p. 104 quoting McPherson, M. F (1995), "The sequencing of economic reforms: Lessons from Zambia, *Development Discussion Paper*, no. 516, Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), November, p. 20

¹⁵⁹ Rakner (2003), p. 65

economic policies.¹⁶⁰ This also contributed to MMD's splinter tendencies already a year after it came to power (see chapter 4.3.1). So, if ZCTU was opposing Kaunda, but was less certain about what it wanted after the introduction of the multi-party constitution, what is given priority on ZCTU's in recent years?

It has been difficult to find a simple answer to this question and this perhaps gives an indication of the answer itself. As mentioned earlier, there is an interest split between private and public sector unions in terms of economic policies. Further, as pointed out by Nyirenda, a representative of the Industrial Relations Court in Zambia, the increased amount of unions has weakened their ability to lobby for the workers demands in an efficient way. This has also led to difficulties in collective bargaining, since the employer has to deal with a number of unions. A clear current example is the education sector, where four unions exist with similar classes or categories of employees, and refuse to bargain jointly for different reasons.¹⁶¹

This line of argument is nevertheless challenged by Shikwe, stating that there has been increased collaboration between the two federations (ZCTU and FFTUZ) in recent years, especially in tripartite consultations. Their affiliates are also said to collaborate in collective bargaining at times.¹⁶² However, this only indicates that collaboration exists in terms of collective bargaining, which concerns labour specific issues. If looking at Törnquist's ideal way of politicisation, we should consider if ZCTU has agreed upon interests beyond those of labour with a possible democratising impact.

Banda made a statement in 1997 concerning ZCTU's weakness to unite around common interests, even if he is not particularly specific. He is of the opinion that the most important aspect the trade union movement has to consider is its priorities and ultimate objectives. The main problem, Banda continues, is that the unity of aims and direction in the trade union movement in Zambia has been lost.¹⁶³ Muneku has made a recent statement, along the same track as Banda, where he states that the problem is that the trade unions have operated without an ideology of their own, that they could be used as a bargaining tool or to create alliances with political parties or other civil groups for their own purposes. However, he continues, the trade union movement are aware of the importance of such alliances and has begun to

¹⁶⁰ Rakner (2000:3), p. 10

¹⁶¹ Nyirenda/Shikwe (2003), p. 7

¹⁶² Ibid. p. 21

¹⁶³ Banda (1997), Chapter 4, p. 8

approach issues connecting with wider social, economic and political interests.¹⁶⁴ A similar trend has been observed by Nyirenda/Shikwe. They point out that the trade union movement has tried to reposition itself in recent years in order to meet the challenges of globalisation, including both the trade unions structures and their approach to issues and policies, so that they ‘fit’ to the new labour market situation.¹⁶⁵ This gives the impression that there is no specific way of politicisation decided upon, even if the awareness of the importance of such an arrangement exists. Given these statements, which can be considered as valid since they are made by people within ZCTU (apart from Banda) between 1997 and 2003, it seems as if ZCTU’s adaptation to the new political and economic environment is still under construction, even if more than a decade has passed since the transition.

Let us continue with the *forms of politicisation*. It is hard to draw any definite conclusions since the priorities found on ZCTU’s agenda are not very prominent. However, labour rights such as working conditions and job creation are given high priority in collective bargaining. According to Nyirenda/Shikwe, at national level employers and the national trade unions take part in consultative organs with the purpose of advising the government concerning economic matters relating to such labour rights. These organs are the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council, made up of an equal number of representatives of the workers, the employers, the Government and the National Economic Advisory Council, where both ZCTU and FFTUZ are represented. The two councils are only advisory; hence the government is not bound by the decisions being made. The labour representatives demanded (in 2003) that the decisions taken by the councils should be binding and not advisory. Possible changes since then go beyond the scope of this study. According to Nyirenda/Shikwe the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council has sometimes failed to meet two times a year as required, which has caused frustration among the participants. However, the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council has managed to play a critical role in the process of reviewing labour laws and been involved in determining minimum wages and other conditions of employment. The National Economic Advisory Council is a policy analysis forum with the capacity to influence public policy and development issues. ZCTU is also represented in the Privatisation Agency, in order to oversee the privatisation process. All these examples indicate that ZCTU tries to facilitate labour

¹⁶⁴ Larmer, “Resisting the State; the trade union movement and working class politics in Zambia 1964-91” Interview with Austin Muneku in Zeilig (2002), p. 114

¹⁶⁵ Nyirenda/Shikwe (2003), p. 18

demands via the state. But as Nyirenda points out, ZCTU's representation in the Privatisation Agency has so far little impact in favour of labour.¹⁶⁶

What about ZCTU's self-management in civil society? The two following statements give an indication of how ZCTU perceives its role in this matter. ZCTU's former President Fackson Shamenda in 2002 criticised the government for not taking the responsibility for education and health and challenged trade unions to widen their commitment to civil society and form strategic alliances in order to fight poverty and violation of human rights.¹⁶⁷ According to a recent statement by ZCTU's vice President David Chingoni, the government is seen as the main responsible for the violations of the labour rights. However, he also points out that both parts - government and trade unions - are responsible for fulfilling demands from workers;

Government should be open to dialog and follow several international labour related conventions, which Zambia has ratified and domesticated. The labour movement on its part will continue pressing for better labour reforms and better conditions of service for its members¹⁶⁸

To sum up, ZCTU in recent years tries to promote labour interests, both via the state and directly within civil society through self-management. The information given above indicates that the situation in Zambia, concerning problems to unite both within the same political space and around common interests, is similar to that of Indonesia at the time of Törnquist's studies. In Indonesia, major movements tried their best to relate specific interests to more general interests. But they got stuck either in a limited kind of politicisation with only a weak social foundation among the 'grassroots' or broader perspectives but without much social basis. Törnquist claims that this made the movements hinder one another and not being able to cause a democratic opening.¹⁶⁹ In Zambia, trade union membership density has decreased as well as ZCTU's financial resources, which also contributes to the limited kind of politicisation in the late 1990's and early 2000's.

¹⁶⁶ Nyirenda/Shikwe (2003), p. 16

¹⁶⁷ Larmer, Miles; "Resisting the state: the trade union movement and working class politics in Zambia, 1964-91" quoting "Workers Voice", Kitwe, July, 2002 in Zeilig (2002), p. 112

¹⁶⁸ "Hands off Members' Subscription" in *Times of Zambia*, (02/05/2005), quoted 03/05/2005

¹⁶⁹ Törnquist (1999), p. 143.

5 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

This study aims to explain the shifting capacity of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) to influence democratisation in Zambia between 1991 and 2001. The ongoing process of democratisation is conceptualised as democratic constitutionalism *and* popular sovereignty. Zambia is argued to be “neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy”.¹⁷⁰ Törnquist’s theoretical approach on politicisation has been used in order to see if it is helpful in understanding ZCTU’s shifting influence on democratisation over time. It has been pointed out that the development in Zambia after 1991 contradicts democratic pluralist theories as ZCTU’s political influence decreased after the multi-party constitution was introduced. The conclusion is that Törnquist’s theoretical approach provides a quite good explanation on why the situation developed as it did, even if a number of other factors also contributed to the marginalisation of ZCTU. The comparison of ZCTU over time indicates that its shifting capacity to influence the democratisation process did not vary *directly* with its strategies to *include people into politics*. Nor did it vary *directly* with the *political space* available; rather it is the *type of politicisation of interests* that is most important as well as how ZCTU *read* the political space.

The study has its point of departure in the criticism of theories on civil society and democratisation, arguing that such theories are not fruitful in explaining why interest organisations in civil society rarely play a significant role after the transition from authoritarian rule or in democratic consolidation. The general criticism of theories on civil society and democratisation has been tied to a post-Marxist framework, emphasising the importance of studying the dynamic relations between civil society *and* the state, with focus on how organisations link up their interests with the state in order to influence politics. One post-Marxist representative is Törnquist who explains organisations’ failure to influence politics with their weak politics of democratisation, or weak efforts to unite under a wide, societal project. When Törnquist discusses Gibbon et al., it becomes evident that the definition of modern civil society primarily concerns only the ‘bourgeois’ labour, mostly with individualised and privatised interests. Plurality of such groupings is not likely to promote general interests and democratisation. Rather, the movements may be trapped in the process through the deepening of civil society, thus being unable to combine single issues/specific interests. According to Törnquist this might lead to conflicts between various groups and

¹⁷⁰ See footnote 28, p. 12

cause that the organisations hinder one other. This is to a large extent what my results show took place in Zambia after 1991. However, the case of Zambia shows that the picture is more complicated.

Before we continue, it must be stressed that the following conclusions shall be seen with caution. Rather than definite answers, the results shall be seen as indications on ZCTU's development and probable future prospects. In the following three sections, the findings presented in 4.3 and 4.4 will be compared and elaborated on in order to discuss the similarities/differences. To begin with, the political space will be compared (5.1), second the political inclusion (5.2) and lastly the politicisation of interests (5.3). The final part will discuss ZCTU's role in democratisation and its futures prospects.

5.1 The Pluralist Paradox¹⁷¹

The results show a quite paradoxical situation, as the political space did not become more accessible for ZCTU after the introduction of the multi-party constitution, neither within the established political system nor within civil society. On the contrary, some factors indicate that ZCTU had more space within civil society prior to 1991. The reason for this can be found in the *changes in labour legislation*, which is in line with the post-Marxist approach since it is an example of the mutual relationship between the state and the civil society. Concerning the political space and ZCTU, the interaction between the state and civil society and how it affected labour has become especially evident. However, the political space within the established political system did not change very much, despite the constitutional changes and the changes in labour legislation; rather the difference lies in how ZCTU *read* the space available. This in turn, can be illustrated by the *fall in trade union membership* and *MMD's non-consultative attitude*.

Let us first analyse the political space within civil society. It has become evident that ZCTU did not only get trapped in the process of privatisation, generating 'privatised and individualised interests' as Gibbon puts it. The federation also got trapped within civil society, mainly due to the passing of the 1990 Act, followed by its elaboration in 1997 and Zambia's ratification of the ILO Conventions that legalised freedom of association and made multiple trade unions possible. This resulted in plurality of movements and political parties in civil

¹⁷¹ This term is used by Rakner in Rakner (2003) and (2000:3). I am not using the term in exactly the same way as Rakner uses it.

society which in turn made it difficult for labour to put forward their demands. Earlier, the political space was dominated only by UNIP and ZCTU due to their close ties through the 1971 Act. But during the 1990's ZCTU became just one among many other civil society organisations, which was a completely new situation compared to the last two decades, where ZCTU took advantage of the effects of its former close ties with UNIP in the formation of MMD; namely the wide-spread mobilisation network. This made the opposition movement too powerful for UNIP to eliminate, even if the government tried to do so by harassing workers and passing the 1990 Act. However, those changes in favour of workers came too late as ZCTU together with the broad coalition mobilised in civil society managed to alter the established political system by the empowerment of civil society resulting in the formation of MMD. The negative effects of the changes in labour legislation did not appear until later during the 1990's.

Concerning the political space within the established political system, several factors indicate that it did not change as much *per se* between 1991 and 2001, as did the space within civil society; rather the differences lies in how ZCTU *read* the political space. When UNIP continued its negotiations with IMF in 1989, it did not close the political space within the established political system totally, but the negotiations were an incitement for ZCTU to *read* the space differently after years of trying to oppose UNIP's policies directly from civil society without much success. The protests culminated around 1989 and ZCTU decided that the only way to influence UNIP's policies was to change the political system itself, by forming a political party opposing the one-party regime. By doing this, ZCTU became a part of the established political system again, according to itself only on a temporary basis. This is Törnquist's ideal type of politicisation, when forces in civil society unite and take center stage by linking up with or forming a political party, operating within a common political space, leaving their former strategic positions. But as the results have shown, it was not enough for ZCTU to keep its influential position.

If we compare the circumstances around the formation of MMD with the developments after 1991, ZCTU was again ignored by the government. The difference this time was that ZCTU was ignored by a party of which it was temporarily itself a part. MMD continued with similar economic policies as initiated by UNIP which resulted in mass redundancies of workers. There was also a dramatic fall in trade union member density during the 1990's. This may explain the pluralist paradox, as ZCTU's channels to the established political system

disappeared despite the multi-party constitutional reform. MMD did not consider ZCTU to constitute a significant electoral base anymore and therefore MMD could ‘run its own business’. Nor did any of the new parties have an agenda that was in favour of labour. Rakner points out that the political parties in 2001 operated in a limited political space; they all had similar stands on economic policies. Furthermore, MMD adopted certain features similar to those of the earlier one-party regime. This time ZCTU did not manage to take center stage by forming a political party on its own, partly due to its weakening through the fall in trade union membership, which decreased ZCTU’s numerical and financial capacity. In 1991, the federation could still live on the regular finances it had been guaranteed since its foundation. ZCTU’s fall in trade union membership was also affected by the organisational proliferation which leads us to the next section.

5.2 Unitary Inclusion but ‘Blurred’ Ideology

In Törnquist’s terminology, in general accordance with Mouzelis,¹⁷² this study has shown that ZCTU did not use incorporation as a strategy to include national unions in the federation neither in 1991 nor in 2001. Instead, ZCTU used similar ways to include members into the federation at both points; namely a *unitary* strategy. As has become evident during the study, there are however, some differences in the context of political inclusion in 1991 and in 2001. In theory, the labour legislation was similar in 1991 and after, but as the 1990 Act was not introduced until December 1990, all national unions at that time were members of ZCTU when MMD was formed. This was the case since UNIP had tied ZCTU and its affiliates to the party through state-corporatism during the one-party era. The effects of the changes in labour legislation came later and ZCTU’s fragmentation must rather be understood in terms of the lack of *mobilisation structures* that followed the splinter tendencies within the trade union movement as well as within MMD.

After 1993, ZCTU openly began to oppose MMD’s economic policies or at least the pace of their implementation. However, all member unions of ZCTU did not agree with the negative stand on privatisation. In particular MUZ’s leadership was of the opinion that mine workers would gain by rapid privatisation. This resulted in MUZ’s disaffiliation from ZCTU in 1994 and other unions followed. This had a devastating effect on the financial situation of ZCTU. Different views on privatisation continued to cause conflicts between workers tied to the private sector and those tied to the public sector and as a consequence FFTUZ was formed in

¹⁷² See footnote 58, p. 19

1997. As evident from recent statements some unions refuse to bargain jointly, which has decreased the workers' influence and in turn decreased their incitement to participate in trade union activities. Trade union density has decreased from 70-80 per cent during the 1980's to 50 per cent from 1990 and onwards. The national unions affiliated to ZCTU are only those in line with ZCTU's stands on economic policies. At the time of MMD's formation all unions affiliated to ZCTU supported its stand against UNIP and its economic policies and its mobilisation network was wide spread across the country.

It seems as if the splinter tendencies within ZCTU has led to problems to link the 'centre' with the 'periphery' as is important for an organisation to persist over time, as Törnquist points out.¹⁷³ ZCTU's wide spread organisational network facilitated communication between the 'grass roots' and the leadership of ZCTU. In recent years, many unions work on their own and do not have resource capabilities to do other things than representing the workers in the office. One may presume that this has led to a 'gap' between the leadership of ZCTU and the national unions. The fact that ZCTU no longer is involved in the activities of the national unions is indicative of this as well as that there are now two trade union federations in Zambia. However, ZCTU is aware of the importance of widening its membership base and broadening the workers' demands to also include general social, economic and political aspects that concerns a wider part of the population.

The difficulties of ZCTU's *unitary* strategy and to link the 'center' with the 'periphery' after 1991 can be traced to ZCTU's ideology and the direction of the trade union movement – it has become 'blurred'. In 1991, the national unions knew what they supported, they were united by what they were against and ZCTU had a clear structure throughout the country with a legitimate leader in Frederick Chiluba. In recent years there are two federations with sometimes conflicting demands, which has created a competition around including members, as the federations are no longer given financial support from the government. The confusion around ZCTU's ideology must be understood in relation to the next section, which deals with ZCTU's type of politicisation.

5.3 ZCTU's Politicisation in 1991 and 2001

The results of the study indicate that the most important one of Törnquist's three aspects to explain ZCTU's shifting capacity to influence politics is the *basis and the forms of*

¹⁷³ See footnote 62, p. 20

politicisation, or in other words; the character of the interests agreed upon and who is responsible for implementing policies and to carry them out. This can of course not be isolated from the other two aspects, but the analysis demonstrates that the core of the differences between 1991 and 2001 is in how ZCTU politicised its interests. Törnquist points out that the ideal type of politicisation does not increase the political influence in the democratisation process automatically, but makes it more likely that such increase will occur, as this study also confirms. Furthermore, the study shows that it is not enough for organisations to unite around a common social project; it also has to be on a long-term basis.

Now time has come to place ZCTU in one or several of the boxes found in the figure below, earlier presented in 2.6.3¹⁷⁴ Let us first look at the *basis of politicisation* in 1991. One can conclude that ‘a real social project’ is what united ZCTU in 1991, even if this was at the same time favourable for workers; hence ZCTU was successful in linking its specific interests to a wider social project, acting within the same political space. As pointed out by Rakner, the majority of the labour representatives she interviewed were certain about the interests they were united around; *pro* a multi-party constitution and *against* UNIP’s economic policies. It is more unclear if the other movements participating in the formation of MMD were against UNIP’s economic policies and it is here that the problem becomes evident; after a movement has captured a political instrument such as a political party, with hindsight, they must have agreed upon long-term common interests in order to stay united. ZCTU and the other civil society organisations did not agree upon such long-term interests. After the multi-party constitution was introduced, ZCTU would return to its traditional role as a trade union movement, working mainly within civil society. Perhaps the leadership of ZCTU was a bit credulous as they pre-supposed that MMD would act in favour of labour and create jobs and change the labour legislation. But as MMD consisted of a broad coalition of interest groups this did not become the case. The question of responsibility of the implementation leads us to *the forms of politicisation*. In 1991, ZCTU saw the only way to promote its interests via the state as the established political system needed to be changed in order for labour interest to be represented. Since ZCTU united around common interests, linked up with other organisations in civil society and a political party, I place ZCTU in 1991 in box C. It can also be argued to be placed in box D, as ZCTU also worked through self-management within civil society. However, as the main focus was to capture a political instrument in order to facilitate the demands from labour, box C is more appropriate.

¹⁷⁴ For repetition see p. 21

The study confirms that specific interests dominated the trade union movement in 2001, when there were divergent views mainly on the commitment to privatisation. Under pluralist circumstances privatised and individualised interests are hard to combine with common interests as Gibbon points out. Supporting Gibbon’s statement is the extreme example of the education sector in Zambia, where four teacher unions exist and refuse to bargain jointly. The increased amount of small unions that have become ‘personalised’ and work on their own also contributes to the fragmented character of the Zambian trade union movement in recent years. Furthermore, ZCTU is deliberately ignored by MMD as the federation and its members no longer serve as a significant electoral base. ZCTU has taken an official stand against MMD and the support from workers in the 2001 elections was weak. Even if ZCTU takes place in national advisory organs and has managed to put forward some interests via the state, its main focus seems to be on how to survive economically by trying to increase its membership base through self-management. Let us again return to the figure below. According to the results in this study, ZCTU in 2001 belongs in box B.

TYPES OF POLITICISATION

Forms of politicisation

Via state/local government only Also via self-management

Basis of Politicisation

	A	B (ZCTU in 2001)
Single issues or specific interests	C (ZCTU in 1991)	D
Ideology or collective interests		

To repeat, in Törnquist’s case study of Indonesia the major actors’ democratising potential did not vary directly with their strategic positions. Rather, his study demonstrates that the organisations that failed to influence politics were found in boxes A and B, focusing on single issues/specific interests, hence their type of politicisation was decisive. The same is true in the case of ZCTU.

5.4 ZCTU's Role in Democratisation and Future prospects

In line with ZCTU's failure to stick to Törnquist's ideal type of politicisation, ZCTU's political influence in the process of democratisation has not been very strong in recent years. Yet, people involved in ZCTU's work seem to be aware of the importance to unite around wider social projects even if results so far have not been seen. The ZCTU leadership tries to broaden its work within civil society in order to make its voice heard. As argued, Zambia is still in "a transitional grey-zone"¹⁷⁵ and therefore perhaps can not be considered to fit in with the majority of conclusions based on studies on the impact of interest organisations after the transition from authoritarianism or in democratic consolidation. Therefore there might still be possibilities for an opening in ZCTU's democratic impact, even if small. Since more than a decade has passed since the introduction of the multi-party constitution, it is doubtful if we can expect any sudden changes in terms of real political influence with overwhelming changes towards democratic consolidation. Zambia is heading for its fourth national election in 2006 and even if the support for MMD is very weak and another party wins the majority of the seats in the parliament, it is not likely that the influence of labour will change much. It would be interesting to look at the role of the international donor community in this context. For further studies, one suggestion is to add an international donor perspective on politicisation; for instance how the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) or major NGOs regard such aspects as the importance of links between different interest organisations and a political party, when giving democracy assistance to different NGOs in Zambia.

¹⁷⁵ See footnote 27, p. 12

REFERENCES

Bibliography

- Akwetey, Emmanuel Obliteifio, 1994: *Trade Unions and Democratisation. A Comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stockholm
- Assarsson, Jan, Svensson, Torsten, 1996: *Att fråga och att svara. En introduktion till statsvetenskaplig metod*, Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen, Uppsala, Sweden
- Banda, Darlington, A., 1997: *The trade union situation in Zambia. An overview of the law, practice and the way forward*, Lusaka: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
- Beckman, Björn, Hansson, Eva, Sjögren, Anders, 2001: *Civil society and Authoritarianism in the Third World*, PODSU, Politics of Development Group, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm
- Beckman, Björn, Sjögren Anders: "Civil Society and Authoritarianism: Debates and Issues – an Introduction", in Beckman, Björn, Hansson, Eva, Sjögren Anders, 2001: *Civil society and Authoritarianism in the Third World*, PODSU, Politics of Development Group, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University
- Boussard, Caroline, "Civilsamhälle och Demokratisering" i Hydén, Göran (ed.) 1998, *Demokratisering i Tredje Världen*, Studentlitteratur, Lund
- Carothers, Tom, 2002: "The End of the Transition Paradigm" in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 1-21
- Diamond, Larry "Introduction: In Search of Consolidation" in Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Yun-han Chu, Tien, Hung-mao (eds.) 1997: *Consolidating the third wave Democracies – Themes and Perspectives*. The John Hopkins University Press
- Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Yun-han Chu, Tien, Hung-mao (eds.) 1997: *Consolidating the third wave democracies – Themes and Perspectives*. The John Hopkins University Press
- "Hands off member's subscription" in *The Times of Zambia*, 02/05/2005, Ndola, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200505020747.html> or <http://www.times.co.zm>, quoted 03/05/2005
- Huntington, Samuel P., 1991: *The third wave - democratization in the late twentieth century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, U.S.A.
- Hydén, Göran (red), 1998: *Demokratisering i Tredje Världen*, Studentlitteratur, Lund, Sweden
- Kampe, Kjell, January 2004: *Zambia*, LO/TCO Biståndsnämnd, available at <http://www.lotcobistand.org>, quoted 03/05/2005
- Larmer, Miles, "Resisting the State: The Trade Union Movement and Working-class Politics in Zambia, 1964-91" Interview with Austin C. Muneku in Zeilig, Leo, Alexander, Anne, Dwyer, Peter, Gwisai Munyaradzi, Larmer, Miles, Renton, David, Seddon, David, Viinikka, Jussi (eds.), 2002: *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham, England
- Melin Mia (ed.), 2002: *Democracy, Power and Partnership - Implications for Development Cooperation*, The Collegium for Development Studies at Uppsala University in cooperation with Sida
- Mupuchi Speedwell, Kabwela Chansa: "Levy has run away from us-Hikaumba" in *The*

- Post 02/05/2005, Lusaka, [http://allafrica.com/stories, 200505020590.html](http://allafrica.com/stories/200505020590.html) or <http://www.post.co.zm>, quoted 03/05/2005
- Nyirenda, E.J, Shikwe, Adrian, December 2003: *Trade Union Country Report Zambia*, Lusaka, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
- Putnam, Robert, 1993: *Making Democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ
- Rakner, Lise, 1992: *Trade Unions in Processes of Democratisation. A Study of Party Labour Relations in Zambia*. Report 1992:6, Chr. Michelsens Institute, Department of Social Science and Development, Norway, University of Bergen.
- Rakner, Lise, 2000:3: *The Pluralist Paradox. The Decline of Economic Interest Groups in Zambia in the 1990s*. Working Paper, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human Rights
- Rakner, Lise, 2003: *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Sweden
- Rudebeck, Lars, Törnquist, Olle, Rojas, Virgilio (eds.): 1998, *Democratization in the third world. Concrete cases in comparative and theoretical perspective*, Macmillan Press Ltd, Great Britain
- Rudebeck, Lars: "On the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation", in Melin, Mia (ed.), 2002: *Democracy, Power and Partnership - Implications for Development Cooperation*, The Collegium for Development Studies
- Rudebeck, Lars, "Beyond Democratic Constitutionalism: On the Two-fold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation", in Williams, Gavin (ed.), 2004: *Democracy, Labour And Politics in Africa and Asia: Essays in honour of Bjorn Beckman*, Centre for Research and Documentation. Kano
- Rylander, Christina, 2004: *Att Studera Afrika. Vägar till källorna*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Sweden
- Schmitter, Philippe C.: "Civil Society East and West" in Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Yun-han Chu, Tien, Hung-mao (1997) *Consolidating the third wave democracies – Themes and Perspectives*. The John Hopkins University Press
- Törnquist, Olle, 1999: *Politics and development a critical introduction*. SAGE Publications Ltd. London
- Törnquist, Olle: "Movement Politics and Development: Preliminary Theoretical Notes on Some Concrete Cases in Kerala and Indonesia" in Beckman, Björn, Hansson, Eva, Sjögren Anders, 2001: *Civil society and Authoritarianism in the Third World*, PODSU, Politics of Development Group, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel, 1989: "Labour Movements in Transition to Democracy" in *Comparative Politics*, July 1989:445-471
- Venter, Denis, 2003:"Democracy and multiparty politics in Africa - Recent Elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho" in *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 1-39
- Williams, Gavin (ed.), 2002: *Democracy, Labour And Politics in Africa and Asia: Essays in honour of Bjorn Beckman*, Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD). Kano
- Zeilig, Leo, Alexander, Anne, Dwyer, Peter, Gwisai Munyaradzi, Larmer, Miles, Renton, David, Seddon, David, Viinikka, Jussi (eds.), 2002: *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham, England

Abbreviations

FFTUZ	Federation of Free Trade Unions in Zambia
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MUZ	Mine Workers Unions of Zambia
NERP	New Economic Recovery Programme
NGO (s)	Non-Governmental Organisation (s)
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNIP	United National Independence Party
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions